

The University of Chicago

PURPOSE THE VARIANT OF THEORY

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

JULIUS TEMPLE HOUSE

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PREFACE

Professor William I. Thomas once remarked to one of his classes in the University of Chicago that the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy meant that in the judgment of the examiners the candidate in a narrow field, with coaching, had done thinking up to grade. It would be impossible for me to make full acknowledgment to all who have indirectly assisted in the "coaching" for the following study. Chiefly and much before all others I am indebted to Professor A. W. Small, the Head of the Department of Sociology in the above-named University. On my entrance into his classes I immediately became deeply interested in his general point of view. I had been in the University only a few weeks when he suggested this theme to me, and I began at once to make a study of the authors here considered and to make the connections with the work of the Department of Sociology in the University.

Two books, both by Professor Small, have been of particular help to me, namely, *Adam Smith*¹ and *The Cameralists*.² In fixing the entire point of view I was greatly assisted by the discussions in the Seminar on Modern Social Problems conducted by Professor Small. In that class were three students to whom I am indebted: Professor Victor Helleberg, now of the University of Kansas, and Dr. and Mrs. L. L. Bernard, now of the University of Minnesota, all earnest and intelligent in social problems to a degree not often met with in student bodies.

My second great obligation is to Professor George E. Vincent. His keen analyses of social processes upon both group and person in his course on Public Opinion would inspire the dullest student of social psychology. Should he read this paper, he will find results of his handiwork in the introductory chapter and especially in the study of the life of Hume.

During my stay in the University, I had the inestimable privilege of assisting Professor Charles R. Henderson in collecting material for his book on Prevention, a part of the souvenir publications made possible by the Sage Foundation for the International Prison Congress of 1910.³

¹ *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology*.

² *The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1910.

³ *Preventive Agencies and Methods*. New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910.

While this did not assist me directly in the preparation of this study, the way in which the author relied upon and illustrated the large, human purpose of the entire science of sociology in the preparation gave me a new appreciation of how all social science is allied to this field. Professor Thomas, in his study of primitive races, gave me some insight into the factors of social change, which has been of use to me in selecting material from the wealth of material on hand for such a study as this. In the Department of Philosophy as well, I found the teaching of Professor Addison W. Moore especially stimulating, and he pointed out directly many of the matters for criticism that appear in the following pages. I do not know whether such complete statement of the influences that make doctors' theses is common, but with me it is matter of gratitude as well as conscience to make all as plain as may be. But when all is said, I leave unsaid the feeling of deep appreciation, not only of what these great teachers have contributed to this unpretentious paper, but of the far greater work that they are doing in influencing the thought of many students of the newer problems of society even as they have influenced mine.

WAYNE, NEBRASKA
January 1, 1925

JULIUS T. HOUSE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The hypothesis upon which this discussion rests is suggested in the introductory sentences of *The Cameralists*, a work by Professor Albion W. Small:

Every theory, system, science is in some way a reflection of the prevailing purposes of the time in which it developed. . . . In some way or other . . . our philosophies echo the dominant purposes of the time that produced them. If we attempt to detach a system of thought from the whole scheme of activities impelled by the prevailing systems of purposes, and if we try to set forth that thought as though it had no connection with those purposes, the result is inevitable misrepresentation. The same effect follows unintentional not less than deliberate separation of a body of thought, in which we are especially interested, from the surrounding circumstances of its development.¹

The view upheld in this study is that such purpose appears as the variant of each writer's theory. That is, that he builds his system of thought by a selective process in which the existing social problems as he sees them are ever the thing more or less clearly in his view and their solution the goal more or less consciously approached. In the operation of solving his problem each writer seizes upon categories that seem to lend themselves to the solution of his problem. He assumes that the science or philosophy that he is thus rearing is to get its reason for being in the service it shall render to the whole process from which the writer is abstracting certain aspects. Whether his task be pure science, abstract philosophy, political science, political economy, or what not, its sole reason for being is assumed to be that it will cast some light upon, assist in some way in, the "on-going of the entire social process."

This shows itself in many ways:

1. In the mere selection of the categories themselves. Of two categories long in use, why should some thinker select the one and leave the other that men eminent in the thinking world for centuries have regarded equally valid? Grant that the case may seem occasionally to be indifferent, what shall we say when again and again he makes the same sort of selection, directed each time to the social problem apparently in his mind?

¹ *The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity*, p. 1. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1910.

2. Again, it appears in the stress upon certain categories, the large burdens they are called to bear relatively to others used by the same author.

3. The begged question must enter in. There are begged questions in the writings of each. But the significant thing is the nature of the question that is begged.

4. It is often easy to perceive a certain blindness to the possible significance of phenomena that swim into view. They are known to be a part of the process but do not fit into the scheme and hence are dropped without discussion.

5. Another common thing is the discussion of certain phenomena and then the definite elimination of them as being abnormal or in some other way not typical.

6. Occasionally a writer seems on the point of saying or presenting something other than that which appears, and one can understand the omission only upon the ground of certain preconceptions in his purpose that render him blind to the dilemma into which he is plunged.

7. A common way in which the hypothesis of this paper is vindicated is the custom of begging the existence of the thing needed as an entity on the ground of its social necessity.

8. It seems to bear out this hypothesis that each thinker comes out in a way satisfying to his apparent view of the social problem.

A second general aspect of the subject is this: the way in which each writer adds to and subtracts from and otherwise modifies the categories of his predecessors. A word of explanation is needed here. Each of the writers discussed belonged to the pre-evolutionary period of thinking. He conceived of a fixed world, already metaphysically existent, to which the real world might and in part did conform. His world in which he lived was "out of joint." He conceived that the solution of the problems of his society and his day would bring about a static condition of satisfaction. But the problem of his day was a small one relatively and existed in a small group. While he was writing, society was moving. The solution achieved, the problem had changed and his successor must find a new road to Utopia. I discuss this phase of the subject in chapters vi and vii. Anyone who wills to find the meaning and the value of this paper will find them there especially in evidence.

Let no one suppose that this paper is a criticism of philosophy, political science, political economy, or anything else as such.

The field of the study lies among the British school of individualism, beginning with Hobbes and ending with John Stuart Mill. It is necessary

in seeking to determine the social purposes of each man to make a sympathetic study of his life. This will involve some knowledge of the social (group) influences under which he lived. We would like to know, though it is not always possible, the influence of those intimate groups of home and school by which a vast number of prejudices and opinions are fixed beyond recall. There is the great company of thinkers, alive or dead or yet unborn, the mighty "choir invisible," to whose unbending judgment every scholar is, consciously or unconsciously, ever submitting his work. It is to be noted that in the cases of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume there are religious groups to be reconciled. With Hobbes there was even his own life to be preserved, and with Locke a great party to be vindicated in the possession of the throne of Great Britain. It is no small task for the leader to prove himself the "problem solver" of his group, to use the phrase of Professor Vincent,¹ to retain some friends among the living, some self-respect in the ideal presence of the great who are gone before and are yet to follow, and it is not to be a matter of wonder if occasionally we find our writers departing from the "trunk line of advance." For it is as true to say that theory is a social product as that it is directed to social purposes.

The vast deposit of presupposition must be defended, amended, and enlarged to protect it against the inroads of other group thinking and feeling, against the attacks of enemies from within the larger group, against the indifference begot by the changing situation. All this is part of the social purpose of the thinker. He seeks a solution satisfactory to the group and the groups within groups to which he belongs.

¹ Unpublished lectures on "Social Groups," also "The Rivalry of Social Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVI, 469.

CHAPTER II

THOMAS HOBBS

Our author was born in 1588 and lived until 1679, within nine years of the English Revolution. He saw a part of the reign of Elizabeth, that of James I and Charles I, the Puritan Revolution, the rule of the Cromwells, and the restoration of the House of Stuart in the person of Charles II. In all his life he was associated with the nobility and even with royalty, being at one time tutor to Charles II. Various books by Hobbes are dedicated to patrons, as follows: to William, Earl of Devonshire, *Elements of Philosophy* (1655), *Philosophical Elements of a True Citizen*; to Mr. Francis Godolphin, *Leviathan* (1651); to William, Earl of Newcastle, *Human Nature* (1640).

He expressed the hope that his work, especially *Leviathan*, would become a textbook for rulers. His conception of government made him regard the teacher as one who should be appointed by the king, and he once apologizes for seeming to usurp that function.

In his first journey to Paris he learned that the scholastic doctrine, which he had disliked while at Oxford, was everywhere treated with contempt.

For eighteen years he led the life of a scholar in the home of William Cavendish. In that time he translated the works of Thucydides. He afterward said that he had learned from Thucydides how much wiser one man was than many, and that he meant to warn his countrymen against trusting popular orators.

He ridiculed the ancient critic who assumed that the scope of history could be "not profit by writing truth but delight of the hearer as if it were a song."

Hobbes met Bacon and may have been thus strengthened in his disbelief in scholasticism, but any influence of Bacon on the thinking of Hobbes is not discernible.

At forty years of age Hobbes had traveled in France, had translated Thucydides, and had been a quiet scholar all his life. About this time the well-known incident related by Aubrey occurred. Hobbes was in Paris in the library of a gentleman and for the first time in his life saw a volume of Euclid and 'twas the 47th *El. Libri I*. He read the proposition. "By God,"

said he, "this is impossible."¹ So he reads the demonstration of it which referred him back to such a proposition: which proposition he read. That referred him back to another, which he also read. *Et sic deinceps* that at last he was demonstratively convinced of that truth. This made him in love with geometry.

The following incident is of equal importance in the development of the thinking of Hobbes. He was at a gathering of learned men where something was said about senses. One of them asked, as in contempt, what was sense? Hobbes thereupon wondered how it happened that men who took such pride in the title of "wise" could be ignorant of the nature of their own senses. Thinking it over, he remarked that if all things were at rest or if all moved alike there could be no difference of things and consequently no sense. Thus we have in these two incidents the method and the theory.

In 1637, Hobbes had begun the execution of a remarkable plan—that of laying the foundation of all scientific inquiry on the principles just enunciated and founding thereon a system of psychology and of sociology. But the year 1637 was big with events. The exaction of ship money had led to the famous action and decision against Hampden. The Scots were restive under the religious formalism imposed by the king. By 1639 Scottish soldiers were in the field successfully resisting the army of the monarch and receiving the sympathy of the people. In 1640 the king appealed to Parliament, which had been suspended for eleven years. Hobbes thought his hour had struck. Leaving the first part of his philosophy to receive fuller discussion at a later date, he published a summary of his psychology and political science, *De Cive*.

Then, in fear for his life, he went to France, "the first of all that fled," as he himself remarked. For eleven years he remained on the Continent. During that period he wrote *Leviathan*, the chief of his works. It has been charged that Hobbes wrote this work to placate the Cromwellian government. The persistence with which the story has been repeated suggests the sinister truth that lurks, even after all reasonable deduction has been made, in Hobbes's picture of antisocial man. The charge was made by Professor Wallis, of Oxford, with whom Hobbes waged a long and bitter battle about geometry. The whole report seemingly rests upon the lack of humor of Lord Clarendon. Clarendon reports that he talked with Hobbes shortly before the publication of the book and asked how he could hold such doctrine.

¹ The incidents of the life of Hobbes are taken from the volume on *Thomas Hobbes* by Leslie Stephen, in the "English Men of Letters Series." London and New York: Macmillan Co.

After "a discourse between jest and earnest," Hobbes replied: "The truth is, I have a mind to go home." Report of this conversation came to the public some twenty years after the event. The defense set up by Hobbes is rather conclusive. The book was published in 1650; Cromwell came to power in 1653. Further than that the *De Cive* was published in 1637, and its political doctrine was identical with that of *Leviathan*. The fact is that neither royalist nor parliamentarian would admit the logic of Hobbes to be valid, that the government *de facto* is the government *de jure*. The boast of Hobbes that he had strengthened the Puritan army was an inadvertence that probably does not imply an original intent to produce that result. In *Leviathan* Hobbes seriously antagonized the churchmen of whatever creed, and the remainder of his life was largely spent in a battle with them. He was once threatened with execution by burning for teaching atheism. At the request of his patron, when eighty-six years old, he wrote against Coke, and got the better of the argument. That he was timid no one will deny, himself least of all; that he was a moral coward, no one ought to believe. No one who studies his work can deny him the courage to be logical, the supremely necessary courage of the thinker.

THE CALVINISTIC THEOLOGY OF HIS DAY FURNISHED HOBBS
A PARALLEL FOR HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Hobbes's primary purpose in writing is *social*. His political philosophy is that in which he has supreme interest. His sensationalism, his nominalism, and his method are all mere preliminaries to his political theory. Summarizing this theory, we find it not unlike the Calvinistic theology under whose influence he lived.

Theology recognized three stages in the life of a Christian. He was, first, an outcast from the Kingdom of God, this condition being due to the transgression of Adam and the resulting depravity of the sons of Adam. He was, next, converted. That is, by a surrender of his will and an act of pardon by his Creator, his nature was changed. The old man was dead, and a new man, a "new creature," was born. He was, in the third place, a member of a heavenly Kingdom.

In a social sense, Hobbes's man is, first, totally depraved. Socially there is no good thing in him. By a deliberate agreement this man lays aside all his rights, constituting sovereignty. By an act of reason, he is transformed, socially converted. Lastly, he becomes a member of the state, submissive to its authority, finding all the good of his life within its protection. This state Hobbes identifies with Christ, taking his place

in the life of humanity until he himself shall come in clouds of glory to reign here on this earth, where, Hobbes believed, heaven is to be.

Hobbes believed that there was a natural frame into which all things social should fit. This frame consisted of a number of natural laws—*leges naturales*—to be discovered by what he called “right reason.” These natural laws were God’s laws, though they were not technically laws until known. These laws, as I said, could all be learned by right reason, but God had also taught them to a few by direct revelation, and to a chosen number they had become known through prophecy.

But Hobbes sought to discover them by the first method, that of “right reason.” He thus added a whole secular world to the theological world of philosophy. He discussed the Kingdom of God, but he created a Kingdom of Man, with distinct utilitarian intent. He believed that he was pointing the way for men to be happy here on earth. His whole aim was social and practical. Leslie Stephen wrote the volume on Hobbes for the “English Men of Letters Series,” but died without being able to carry out all his purpose in writing it. Had he lived he would have traced the influence of Hobbes on English utilitarianism, and certainly we find the thinking of this old author had much in common with that of the great school of Bentham and the Mills.

He took the next step necessary in his day, that of turning men’s attention to man and his life on earth as a thing worth while for its own sake. His question in the turmoil of his day was: How may men have protection in the pursuit of the arts of peace? I undertake here to show that in his epistemology Hobbes selects and emphasizes those categories that assist him in getting a *πῶς* by which he can move society to the place where he wants it to be. Social order has broken up. The divine right of kings is a rejected doctrine. Men like Hampden are upsetting the structure and undermining the foundation. How shall we secure unity? Unity we must have as a basis for any satisfaction. No halfway measure will do. Authority is absolutely necessary. That authority must rest on some one undivided, simple principle. This must mean “monism.” Hobbes seizes upon it with a faith and eagerness that can be shaken by nothing. The question as to how this unity has ever been broken up, seeing it is by nature one and indivisible, never disturbs our serene logician, though it is these very differences that he is trying to make into oneness. It does not trouble him, though he deals right along in all his work with the material that others say with equal confidence spells pluralism.¹

¹ All references to Hobbes are to the Molesworth edition.

Thus, having resolved the universe into "body,"¹ Hobbes immediately and with serenity of soul says that there are two kinds of body²—sensible body and the state. Amazing as this statement is, Hobbes never attempts to defend the claim. Is the state then material? If not, then what becomes of his materialism? What remnant of the influence of the despised scholasticism or the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, whose work Hobbes never ceased to deride, has enabled this practical gentleman to seize upon the most mystical of all their conceptions and hand it to all generations without note or comment as a self-evident truth? It is this: Hobbes is writing a philosophy preparatory to his political science, and that political science is founded upon his conception of society. Now, the state must be real, whatever else is fancy. All reality is body, therefore the state is body. Thus we have Augustine's *City of God* brought down into a scientific theory.

Equally, in discussing the ideas of space and body Hobbes moves serenely in a circle and is utterly unconscious of the fact.³ The argument is this: We get our notion of space by reason of our idea of magnitude. We get our notion of body by the fact that it occupies space. Is space, then, ideal? If so, the monism of materialism falls to pieces and the simple principle that is to resolve all difficulties by eliminating differences is no principle at all. The fact is that Hobbes had no philosophical problem as such. He was not concerned with pure philosophy as such. It is merely incidental or preparatory to his sociology. Otherwise we might expect at least a serious attempt to resolve these contradictions.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HOBBS DOES NOT FURNISH HIM
WITH A MERELY ANTISOCIAL MAN

In the criticism that has been showered upon Hobbes, much is said of the antisocial nature of his man. I purpose to show that this antisocial nature of man is not found in his psychology proper, but is "smuggled in," so far as the science of his system is concerned. The reason for this *tour de force* is found not in Hobbes's psychology but in his sociology. So far as his psychology is concerned, Hobbes's man is merely an automaton. Says our author:

Originally all conceptions proceed from the action of the thing itself, whereof it is the conception. . . . By our several organs we have several conceptions of several qualities in the object.⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 672, also 381.

² *Ibid.*, I, 11.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 102, 103.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 3.

Again, "Mutation can be nothing else but the motion of the parts of a body that is changed."¹ That is, the only change in reality, body, is change of place, motion. Consciousness is, then, a form of motion. This is pure sensationalism. It leaves man subject to error. The sensations give him pictures that may be true or false. It is only later in his logical theory that Hobbes rises to the second level of man's thinking, namely, science, where, as I shall show, he arbitrarily and naïvely relieves himself of the burden of his sensationalism. So far, then, man is an automaton, jerked by unseen wires, but certainly there is nothing here to show why he is of necessity antisocial.

When Hobbes discusses the passions, this point is even more in evidence. In that discussion the social passions have a nearly equal place with those less desirable. Thus, benevolence, which is defined as "desire of good to another," is identical with charity.² If this benevolence is directed toward man in general it is called "good nature." Magnanimity in danger is "valor," "fortitude."³ Love of persons for society is called "kindness."⁴ "Joy, from apprehension of novelty, admiration,"⁵ is spoken of as proper to man because it "excites the appetite of knowing the cause." "Grief for the discovery of some defect"⁶ is approved especially in young men as a sign of a love of good reputation. Again, "desire of knowledge and arts of peace inclineth men to obey a common power. Desire of praise disposeth to laudable actions. . . . Desire of fame after death the same." Again, "The passions that incline to peace are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them."⁷ Enough quotation has now been given to show the fact that Hobbes's psychology does not call for an antisocial man. At another place⁸ he lays great emphasis upon antisocial aspects of conduct, but that is done in the process of building the science by which the state is to be constructed. All that will be fully noted later.

From the foregoing may we not conclude that Hobbes was by his purpose partially blinded to the significance of some of the phenomena revealed by his own analyses of the processes under consideration?

Suppose, for instance, that Hobbes had had a different theory of the origin of society to defend—not the hyperconscious theory of the "contract." Has he not here material to his hand, not involving so wretched

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, III, 43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-16.

a view of human nature as that finally emphasized by him, by which he might have constructed a state? In more peaceful days he might have lingered long enough, might he not, over some of these pleasing suggestions, to have made a golden age out of the past instead of the "mean, nasty brutish" picture that he has given us? Certainly Hobbes has, even in this meager analysis, revealed knowledge of the operation of forces that might make society on a different plan from the one he employs. If he had seen that his view of courage, for instance, involved the possibility of a man's throwing away his life for a great cause or for a whim; if he had seen the love of approval making of one man a heroic leader, of another an obedient follower; in short, if he had seen the interests in various men and varying in the same man at different times, he would not have been obliged to overemphasize the antisocial in men in order by their very misery to compel them to the contract. So Hobbes seems to have admitted the social instincts into his list by inadvertency. He is blinded to the significance of them by a pre-conceived theory of rational contract.

There is yet another bit of the psychology here under consideration that illustrates the same blindness to the possible uses to which it might be put in a different theory of society. It is this: In two places Hobbes speaks of life as of necessity a game, a movement from an end accomplished, this end contributing to a farther end to which one strives. He says:

Trains of thought are regulated by the presence of some end desired. Ends may be near or farther off. Those which are nearer and contribute to the later end are means as well as ends. But for the utmost end in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity there is no such thing in the world nor way to it more than to Utopia; for while we live we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end.¹

The other place in which Hobbes recognizes the game as the thing is that famous passage in which he likens life to a race. Now, Hobbes fails utterly to use this conception in his political science. There is movement. But his conception of sovereignty, isolated from any possible influence upon it by the movement of life, is the most static of all conceptions. I do not mean that he meant that the policies of a ruler could not be influenced by human need, but the sovereignty could not be so influenced. It was an entity ever located in one place and as unchangeable as the nature of God.

¹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 52-53.

THE LOGICAL THEORY OF HOBBES

The fascination of mathematics was upon Hobbes. I shall undertake to show that in the application as well as in the choice of his method he has ever in mind his social purpose, and that he stresses one point and ignores another in a way that would be entirely arbitrary on any other basis of judgment. If we are to have orderly life in the world we must have science, fixed and sure and everlasting; so thought Hobbes. One thing is fixed and sure and eternal—that is geometry. Hobbes visualized the universe in added lines. Sovereignty was a proposition to be demonstrated.

The first member of the hierarchy in Hobbes's logical theory is nominalism. Names are the only universals.¹ When we generalize the complex idea that we call Man, we have no idea of any real essence apart from the group of impressions taken together. The only thing that is common to all men in the idea Man is the name. If we are going to tie the atoms that compose the human race together, if we are going to add them and other things that have to do with them, we must have something simple and universal concerning which there can be no dispute. That one thing is the name. It is the name only that is subject to scientific treatment, for about science there can be no uncertainty. Otherwise it would not be science. Names can be added, therefore they may be the units out of which science is made. When you have abstracted from individual men everything that is individual, you have left the universal name. In this name are certain other names contained, says Hobbes, as Man, selfish, equal, killing, proving the necessity of restraining power. The reason for all this abstraction and addition is that he is trying to create a science, which was something other and more certain than any generalized experience. "No prudence," he says, "skill in judging by signs,"² is sufficient ground of assurance of truth. That can come only by the addition and subtraction of names.

In the foregoing Hobbes makes a violent separation between his nominalism and his sensationalism. Hobbes does not say that sensation has nothing to do with thinking, but he does say that it has no part in science, at least not directly.

This all comes out in the discussion of the need of names. It is to be remembered that he places all the secondary qualities, not in the object, but in the sentient.³ Movement in the object begets movement in the sentient which takes the form of the sensations of sight, hearing,

¹ *Ibid.*, III, 21.² *Ibid.*, IV, 18.³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

etc. But these will not beget science because they do not beget names, at least not directly. They do not give us concepts (for name is concept). If a man deaf and dumb, says Hobbes, were to see a triangle and were to look at it long enough, he might see that the angles thereof were equal to two right angles. But if he later saw the triangle in a different position (presumably so that memory would not help him), he would not at once see that the angles were equal to two right angles but would be obliged again to study it out. This is because he has no name.¹

Now, the value of all this to my hypothesis is that Hobbes here throws away sensation as a means to learning truth that is certain, that is science. Experience has much to do with sensation, but experience is uncertain. In it there is disagreement, though why there should ever be uncertainty in monism is, of course, not clear in Hobbes or any other writer. Hobbes thus divides the operations of the mind that are directly affected by sensation from the concepts, names, because he conceives the former subject to error, and science must not be so subject.

I believe that those who have taken delight in showing the inconsistency between the sensationalism and the nominalism of Hobbes would have better understood him if they had noted more carefully that he was using his nominalism as the beginning of his dualism between experience and science. Of course he begs the question. He is to be praised that he did not beg a larger number of questions. He merely does this work of isolating names from sensation because he is building a universal science—method. There were in his day no sciences. There was science, one and indivisible.

Just why does Hobbes feel so sure that science is more certain than experience? The question is very pertinent, for the reason that Hobbes shows the part of experience in the process of naming, and names are the first elements of his science. Why is experience generalized in a name or names or in any other way more certain than the original experience? Yet this is the method of all science previous to the evolutionary period. This yearning desire for certainty seeks in some mystical way to rise above experience. It must do so as long as it is conceived that the real world is a fixed, eternal thing; that all problems arise from departure from the real. Now, I am not saying that Hobbes's choice of names as the only universals is the result of his purpose more than would have been a choice of real essence, except that it accords with Hobbes's practical temperament, but what I do emphasize is this: that in the development of a science absolute certainty seemed necessary. Science was to be

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 22.

fixed. Experience was a thing about which men could differ. Hence Hobbes could seize upon something to add and, in his eagerness for the establishment of a science, assert that here was certainty, while all the while the simple universals that were added were made up out of that very experience which Hobbes warns us cannot be trusted.

Right there, then, under his observation are the rejected things, the things of experience, out of which another might have made an argument for a different sort of science—a science to be tested at each point by experience and reconstructed in the light of the unfolding of experience. At this point, then, Hobbes throws away for all time all that he has said as to the value of experience and prudence (skill in judging) as being unscientific, and begins the construction of his argument for sovereignty by taking only a part of what he has said as to the nature of man and making it a term in the addition, “Man, selfish, equal, killing.” He could just as reasonably have said “Man, benevolent,” etc. At this point where Hobbes has arbitrarily ignored the social instincts already enumerated by his analysis of the passions, he has departed “from the trunk line,” has begun the isolation of his theme from the entire process from which it gets its justification. But he has done this, not because he has forgotten that he has ascribed to man social instincts, but because he is constructing a science. He has been enabled to do this by asserting that science is certain while experience is not. He can then drop out of science anything in experience that is not subject to science.

Concerning this inconclusiveness of experience, etc., we may say at least that in the main we live our lives by just such experiments and conjectures used over and over as guides and means to the ends we seek, and that it is in making these experiments and testing these conjectures that we establish the reactions which then pass from the stage of experiment to become habit, the basis for new activities. All this Mill sought to incorporate in his system of logic. Hobbes has passed over these considerations too lightly from our standpoint, because he can find scientific thinking, the point to generalize, only by the adding of names—arbitrary signs.

Modern sociology admits that experience must be generalized but claims that there is no science that is more certain than experience—analyzed and generalized. All of the sociological thinking since Hobbes has struggled with this problem. If, when Hobbes talked of experience, he could have talked of common racial experience, he would not have been so sure of his dualism.

In like manner, as he deals with the antisocial nature of man, he also describes another term in the argument, that of equality. Men are equal in essentials but especially in that which proves the need of the state—the power to kill.¹ Later Hobbes was so troubled about the popular leaders who had “interests” of their own and who misled the people that he decided absolutely and in terms to eliminate such from all scientific consideration by deciding that they were agents of the evil powers who exercised witchcraft over the minds of the masses.² This is the same method as that used by many modern constructors of science when they declare something not typical. It does not simply ignore phenomena; it denies their reality.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF HOBBS

I hesitate whether to call this section of the discussion political science or moral science. It is both. Hobbes is seeking the establishment of the state as a guardian over the entire social process. With the establishment of the state there is to come over this social process a change that is like unto that of conversion over the soul of the sinner.

All that Hobbes says about the antisocial nature of man is said to give a scientific basis to the state. Under the state of nature there reigns the *jus naturale*,³ the right to everything that is possessed by everybody. Then men are not only antisocial; they are also equal particularly in power to slay, for the weakest can slay the strongest. This produces a state of war. It is utter misery. Now, all this does not for a moment imply that Hobbes believed that a large number of men ever lived without any restraint of law. It is merely a hypothesis. The hypothesis is necessary to the demonstration of the existence of the social laws that he is about to establish. So here we have some more abstracting from the whole of human experience in order to serve the social purpose that Hobbes has in view, namely, to assist the ongoing of the social process by demonstrating the state. Over against this state of nature is a sort of Elysium that is to exist when Leviathan is established and is fully functioning, which will be when Christ comes to reign. Meanwhile Leviathan may function in part. In order to escape the state of war, men by an act of reason, the possibility of which is assumed but not discussed, contract society. The chief feature of the contract is that it is one-sided.⁴ The people give up everything and are without guaranties that the government will serve them well. Hobbes gets over this by the assumption

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 110.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 69.

that the interests of the government and that of the people are identical. Under the rule of the state the *jus naturale* goes out and the mild *leges naturales*, "social rules," come in. Thus is man socially converted.

These *leges naturales* Hobbes finds by the same method of abstracting from the whole experience that he has used all along. There are nineteen of them, and, in statement of them, in order to give them scientific standing, Hobbes emphasizes the rationalistic and egoistic in man to the degree that shows no recognition of the social passions that he enumerated earlier. Thus he says that gratitude is obligatory because without receiving it in return for good deeds men will not exercise benevolence.¹

But even after he has rationalized all his theorems, brought them under his science, he is still unsatisfied and resorts to the method always necessary when science fails, that of begging the question of the basic law, the one on which all the others rest, the obligation to keep contract. He defends this as an eternal entity, and his reasoning has two features. First, it begs the question by the assertion, the terms of which are identical, that one is obligated to discharge that to which he is obligated. Second, it is asserted that without this obligation society cannot exist, which is intelligible. And just here I note that these two features often occur together in these writers, the abstract entity being assumed as truly existent because it is needed.²

As a social proposition Hobbes's obligation to keep contract would have no very strong restraint upon Hobbes's antisocial, rationalistic, egoistic man. So Hobbes is obliged, having already ignored the social passions in the preliminary stages of his science, to appeal to obligation as an entity apart from any psychology that he has presented.

At any rate, by his method of addition and subtraction Hobbes has accomplished that which he set out to do. He has located sovereignty, has isolated it, made it a thing in itself subject to no restraint. This is the characteristic feature of Hobbes's contract—its one-sided nature. The problem of government in the time of Hobbes was the deadlock. There can be no deadlock here. Hobbes has solved his problem. He has done this by doing three things: (1) he has definitely located power and responsibility, (2) he has created an obedient people, (3) he has identified the interests of the ruler and the ruled. All along in this search for the hidden thimble, Hobbes knew where it lay reposing under the pillow. The government may now collect taxes in whatever way it pleases. There will be no danger of the king's losing his head. All power is his,

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. III.

² *Ibid.*, p 130.

all property is his; he is the executive, the legislative, and the judicial power.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOBBS

I wish here to show that the result of the long train of abstracting has been to give us something of value to the whole social process. In a measure this helps to establish the hypothesis with which this paper opens.

It has often been charged that Hobbes's work results in something monstrous, that he leaves nothing in the life of the people worth while, giving all the really valuable human experience to the rulers, etc. To discuss each of the three features of the government conceived by Hobbes will clear up some of this misapprehension.

Hobbes wrote his book hoping that it might become a textbook for kings. The kings were to understand all the aspects of this science. The critic of Hobbes attacks the absurd "contract." Well, it is only a hypothesis. There is nothing in Hobbes to show that he ever believed that the state of nature as a result of which he creates contract ever had any actual existence. Further, how could he so believe? Hobbes was a devout Christian, at least he so appears to have been in his attitude toward the Bible, and does not the Bible tell how society originated in the Garden of Eden? Hobbes did not believe that any hypothesis need consist with reality any more than a long line of distinguished gentlemen who have been in the business of creating sciences while you wait since the day of Hobbes. A just interpretation of Hobbes's argument is merely this: Given such a state of nature as might arise and you will inevitably find men ready to surrender the power to the one who can wield it well. He further holds that the hypothesis is not impossible. Thus he gets his obedient, socially converted people.

The critics also attack his isolated sovereignty and with insufficient cause. In my study I have found one writer who really tried to understand Hobbes—Leslie Stephen. Hobbes's argument is in no sense a defense of tyranny. He merely says that a government that functions as a government must not be hindered in the exercise of its functions.

The third point of criticism is that the interest of the ruler and the ruled is not the same. Hobbes would perhaps do a little abstracting here and say that the interest of the ruler *as a ruler* is identical with the strength and quiet of his nation. But even on the broad proposition as stated is there not a chance for Hobbes? In order to get on in any science built by abstracting from the whole process you must beg some question. Why is not this a good one to beg? Suppose the kings of earth were able to see in their power exercised to protect their subjects the

only good of monarchs and as a result a code binding upon monarchs, an *esprit de corps*, were to grow up; what then? Would not the Hobbes hypothesis be worth while? It is true that Hobbes saw the question of the power of the government to govern very large in his day, but he left a place for many things that have later been used to the advantage of the people.

For it must not be forgotten that the king represents the will of the people; he is that will personified, and the first desire of the people is to be left alone to pursue the arts of peace undisturbed. Now, to say that the interests of the two parties are here identical is not so impossible. The people get their desire by being protected, and the king gets his by being a mighty, protecting God. For he represents Christ in the Christian state that is to be established at the end of the world. Does it not seem possible that the altruism of the king would go as far to identify the interests of the ruler and the ruled as will the identity of interest between the laborer and the capitalist of which we hear so much and see so little? Surely our scientist has as good a right to beg his question as have those later authors whose work, respected in the shining galaxy of sciences, was accomplished by this identical method.

The idea that the king represents the will of the people in a very real sense has had a marked effect upon the idea of law. Thus Hobbes makes use of it:

"But," said James I, "have I not reason as well as my judges?" And may not the people say, "Have we not reason, as well as our courts?"

Thus Coke answers:

To which it was answered by me that true it was that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.

To which Hobbes replies:

But the doubt is of whose reason it is that shall be received for law. It is not meant of any private reason, for then there would be as Sir Edward Coke makes it, an "artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience," as was his. For it is possible long study may increase and confirm erroneous sentences, and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin; and of those that study with equal time and diligence, the reason and the resolutions are, and must remain, discordant;

and therefore it is not that *jurisprudentia* or wisdom of subordinate judges, but the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command that makes law.¹

Hobbes does not identify the state with society except in a metaphysical sense. Everything that is not forbidden by law is by inference specifically permitted, is legal in a positive sense. Thus, technically under the state man has no rights, but practically, in the chance to pursue any ordinary vocation or activity, he has more rights than ever before.

Practically, Hobbes has merely isolated the ruling function and placed that in the state. That the social processes are going on under the protection of the state and that men are to enjoy the satisfaction of life without unnecessary hindrance from the authorities is assumed, and it seems as if it should be unnecessary so to state. The things that man is to enjoy under the state are clearly suggested by the reverse of his picture of the dreadful state of nature as set forth in *Leviathan*, III, 13:

In such a condition there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving or removing such things as require force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, nasty, brutish and short.

In place of this dismal picture we are to have a government over the people whose duty is to care for the people, prescribe trade regulations, establish a system of public education, employ counselors who should study the need of state and of people. Such commissions as those for the regulation of tariff, wages, child labor, etc., would all be a necessary part of the duty of government toward society as Hobbes conceived. Thus Hobbes vindicates the substitution for divine right of kings the divine right of force.

PURPOSE THE VARIANT OF THE THEORY OF HOBBS

In this long process of selection in order to construct a science, what has been stressed? The principle of monism, the harmless name, the antisocial man, equality of men, the rationalistic man.

What have we dropped by the way because they did not function in the science? The sensationalism by which thought begins, the social passions, the phenomenon of leadership as being evil, and a creation of the evil powers.

¹ Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of Law* (pamphlet read before the American Bar Association, 1909).

What points have been begged? Obligation to keep contract as an entity, never varying, eternal; the identity of the interests of the ruler and the ruled; the existence of the state as body; the certainty of science as against the uncertainty of experience.

What have we as a result? A government that can function, the supreme need of society as Hobbes saw it.

What good does that do? It enables life to go on, men to seek knowledge and wealth, long life, and heaven. Was ever Utopia better conceived or more logically defended?

CHAPTER III

JOHN LOCKE

Locke's boyhood coincided very nearly with the troubles of the civil wars. "I no sooner perceived myself in the world," he wrote in 1660, "but I found myself in a storm which has lasted almost hitherto." His father, when Locke was hardly ten years old, publicly announced, in the parish church of Publow, his assent to the protest of the Long Parliament, and, a few weeks afterward, took the field, on the parliamentary side, as captain of a troop of horse in a regiment of volunteers. Though the fortunes of the family undoubtedly suffered from this step on the part of the young attorney, the political and religious interests which it created and kept alive in his household must have contributed, in no small degree, to shape the character and determine the sympathies of his elder son.

Locke, then, may be regarded as having been fortunate in early surroundings. Born in one of the most charming of the rural districts of England, not far, however, from a city which was then one of the most important centres of commerce and politics; springing from respectable and well-to-do parents, of whom the father, at least, possessed more than ordinary intelligence; accustomed, from his earliest boyhood, to watch the progress of the great events, and to listen to the discussion of great and stirring questions; there seems to have been nothing in his early life to retard or mar the development of his genius, and much that we may not unreasonably connect with the marked peculiarities, both moral and intellectual of his subsequent career.¹

From his father, John Locke (b. 1605), who seems to have inherited a fair estate, and who practiced, with some success, as a country attorney, our author probably derived, if not his earliest instruction, at least some of his earliest influences and some of his most sterling characteristics. Lady Masham says in a MS letter quoted by Mr. Fox-Bourne in his *Life of Locke*:

From Mr. Locke I have often heard of his father that he was a man of parts. Mr. Locke never mentioned him but with great respect and affection. His father used a conduct toward him when young that he often spoke of afterwards with great approbation. It was the being severe to him by keeping him in much awe and at a distance when he was a boy, but relaxing, still by degrees,

¹ The discussion of the life of Locke is practically all taken from Thomas Fowler, *Life of Locke*. New York: John Wurtelle, Lovell, 1881.

of that severity as he grew up to be a man, till, he being become capable of it, he lived perfectly with him as a friend. And I remember he has told me that his father, after he was a man, solemnly asked his pardon for having struck him once in a passion when he was a boy.

Locke appears to have commenced his residence at Christ Church in the Michaelmas Term of 1652, soon after he had turned twenty years of age. His matriculation before the vice-chancellor bears the date of November 27. Since the outbreak of the civil wars, both the university and the college had undergone many vicissitudes. At the moment when Locke entered, Cromwell was chancellor; and Dr. John Owen, who was destined to be for some time the leading resident, had been recently appointed dean of Christ Church and vice-chancellor of the university. Owen was an Independent, and, for a divine of that age, a man of remarkably tolerant and liberal views. Though, then as now, a dignitary in Owen's position probably had and could have but little intercourse with the junior members of his society, it is not improbable that Locke may have derived his first bias toward those opinions on the question of religious toleration, for which he afterward became so famous, from the publications and the practice of the Puritan dean of Christ Church.

Though it was not till a much later period of his life that Locke published any works, his pen was at this time by no means idle. In 1661 he began a series of commonplace books, often containing long articles on the subjects which were occupying his thoughts at the time. It is, moreover, to the period immediately preceding or immediately following the Restoration that Mr. Fox-Bourne attributes an unpublished and till recently unknown essay, entitled "Reflections upon the Roman Commonwealth." Many of the remarks in this essay already show what we should call liberal opinions in religion and politics, and anticipate views long afterwards propounded in the works on government and toleration. The religion instituted by Numa is idealized, as having insisted on only two articles of faith, the goodness of the gods and the necessity of worshipping them, "in which worship the chief of all was to be innocent, good, and just." Thus it avoided "creating heresies and schisms," and "narrowing the bottom of religion by clogging it with creeds and catechisms and endless niceties about the essences, properties, and attributes of God.¹

Of more interest, perhaps, is another unpublished treatise, written just after the Restoration, in which Locke asks, and answers in the affirmative, the following question: Whether the civil magistrate may lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things in reference to religious worship. This tract seems to have been intended as a remon-

¹ Written of his Oxford life as a tutor.

strance with those of the author's own party who questioned any right in the civil magistrate to interfere in religious matters, and who, therefore, were ready to reject with disdain the assurance of compromise and moderation contained in the king's declaration on ecclesiastical affairs, issued at the beginning of his reign. Locke, at that time, like many other moderate men, seems to have entertained the most sanguine hopes of pacification and good government under the rule of the new monarch. He writes:

As for myself there is no one can have a greater respect and veneration for authority than I. I no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a storm, which has lasted almost hitherto, and therefore cannot but entertain the approaches of a calm with the greatest joy and satisfaction. I find that a general freedom is but a general bondage, that the popular asserters of public liberty are the greatest ingrossers of it too, and not unfitly called its keepers.¹

This reaction, however, against the past, and these sanguine expectations of the future, can have lasted but a short time. The tendencies of the new government were soon apparent and the pamphlet was never published.

It is an unexplained circumstance that, notwithstanding a letter to the Hebdomadal Board from Lord Clarendon, then chancellor of the university, signifying his assent to a dispensation enabling Locke to accumulate the degrees of Bachelor and Doctor in Medicine, he never took those degrees. The obstacle may have arisen from himself, or, more probably, it may have been due to some sinister influence on the Hebdomadal Board preventing the assent of that body to the required decree. Anyway, it is curious that, eleven days after the date of Lord Clarendon's letter, is dated the dispensation from the Crown enabling him to retain his studentship, notwithstanding his neglect to enter holy orders.

They left England² in the middle of November, 1665, and arrived at Cleve, the capital of Brandenburg, on the thirtieth of the same month (December 9, N.S.). Here they remained for two months, the mission coming to nothing, in consequence of the English government being unable or unwilling to advance the money which the elector required as the price of his adhesion. The state papers addressed by the ambassador of the government at home are mainly in Locke's handwriting; but far more interesting than these are the private letters addressed by Locke

¹ Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

² On the visit to the elector of Brandenburg.

to his friends—Mr. Strachey, of Sutton Court, near Bristol, and the celebrated Robert Boyle. These are full of graphic touches descriptive of the manners and peculiarities of the people among whom he found himself. Like a conscientious sight-seer, he availed himself of the various opportunities of observing their eating and drinking, attended their devotions—whether Catholic, Calvinist, or Lutheran—submitting himself to be bored by poetasters and sucking theologians, and consoled himself for the difficulty of finding a pair of gloves by noting the tardiness of German commerce. Though he had “thought for a while to take leave of all University affairs,” he found himself ridden pitilessly by an “academic goblin.”

One circumstance Locke noticed much to the advantage of the foreigners, namely, their good-natured toleration for one another’s opinions. Writing to Boyle, he says:

The distance in their churches gets not into their houses. They quietly permit one another to choose their way to heaven; for I cannot observe any quarrels or animosities amongst them upon the account of religion. This good correspondence is owing partly to the prudence and good-nature of the people, who, as I find by inquiring, entertain different opinions without any secret hatred or rancour.¹

During the summer of 1666, we are introduced to one of the turning-points in Locke’s life—his first acquaintance with Lord Shaftesbury, or, as he then was, Lord Ashley. Of the chequered career of the enigmatical character of this celebrated nobleman it is no part of my task to speak. It is enough to say that, as an advocate of religious toleration and an opponent alike of sacerdotal claims in the church and absolutist principles in the state, he appealed to Locke’s warmest and deepest sympathies. The acquaintance was made through David Thomas, an Oxford physician, and the occasion of it was Lord Ashley’s coming to Oxford to drink the Astrop waters. The duty of providing these waters (Astrop being a village at some distance from Oxford) seems to have been intrusted by Thomas to Locke, but, there having been some miscarriage, Locke waited on Lord Ashley to excuse the delay. Lady Masham says:

My lord, in his wonted manner, received him very civilly, accepting his excuse with great easiness, and when Mr. Locke would have taken his leave of him, would needs have him to stay supper with him, being much pleased with his conversation. But if my lord was pleased with the company of Mr. Locke, Mr. Locke was yet more so with that of my Lord Ashley. The result of this short and apparently accidental interview was the beginning of an intimate

¹ Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18.

friendship, which seems never afterwards to have been broken, and which exercised a decisive influence on the rest of Locke's career.

From this time forward we find Locke in the midst of the struggles of his time. He is a participant in the prerevolutionary difficulties, is once expelled from Christ Church, is under the ban with the authorities at Oxford, is practically an exile in the Netherlands, is ever writing for toleration, up to a certain point, and finally embodies his ideas in forms that are acceptable to lawgivers of his day. Hence, though in the same struggle in which Hobbes took part in its earlier stages, he is on the opposite side and his whole sympathy is with human rights as he conceives them. He would have order, but not at the expense of the individual. Government at any point must be an adjustment of the two sides, a compromise of interests, at least in a moderate degree. Locke is the one who conceived the state of Nature as that of a mild and beautiful condition in which Nature was a nourishing mother and man had but to be in harmony with her in order to be happy. This idea was seized by Rousseau and influenced the thought of the French philosophers of the following generation. But Locke was too stern a moralist to make the use of his own conception that the French made of it.¹ Locke, then, in comparison with Hobbes, looked much more on men as individuals than upon the state. As in the case of his great predecessor, there is an interesting incident connected with the writing of his most notable book. In conversation with friends over a difficult question he became convinced that it was necessary to study the human mind and find with what objects it is fitted to deal. Locke's most earnest and substantial work, then, is psychology, or better mental philosophy, as he did not make an exhaustive study of the affective side of consciousness as did Hume and as was attempted somewhat cursorily by Hobbes. As will be noted in full, Locke does not assert that his is a cosmic study; it is in a narrow field and its limits are clearly set forth. Though it is suggested by Hobbes, Locke is the first to develop the associational psychology. He seeks to find out what the mind can be certain of by the process of comparing ideas. That he shifts his point of view to some extent will be pointed out later, but he is to be judged as a mental philosopher and to a slight degree as a political scientist, but not as a sociologist. He did not attempt to show what would result in the larger processes of society as a whole if his ideas were accepted. This last Hobbes did do and in so doing mapped out the field of thought more

¹ References to Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* are to the edition of Valentine Seaman. New York: J. and J. Harper, 1824.

completely than did Locke. Locke could not accept Descartes' view of the mind because Descartes had given the whole world to God. It belonged in no sense to man. The Calvinistic view was that the world belonged both to God and to man. That is, there was both foreordination on the part of Deity and free will on the part of man. In the end the two worlds must coincide, but man must make it his own by his experience. That the task of making God's world in any real sense man's world was impossible did not occur to Locke. He thought he did just that thing, but that he did not do so appears plainly. But his purpose was the variant of his theory. It made him blind to many an implication that appeared plainly to Kant and to his successors.

First, then having done away with the *a priori* by denying to the mind any innate ideas,¹ he finds the mind to be a *tabula rasa*,² swept clean of anything that shall bias it in receiving the perceptions of sensation. Now, Locke says that in receiving such ideas the mind is for the most part passive.³ But we ask, why "for the most part"? Can a *tabula rasa* have any part in getting any ideas? Then the mind seems suddenly endowed with a further power of initiative, for in the ideas of reflection it has activity in getting them and molding them.⁴ A chief characteristic of the mind in each case, that of getting its ideas of sensation and its ideas of reflection, is its "fitness to receive" them. This is a great way from the *tabula rasa*, and how much better is it than the innate ideas of Descartes? Locke is handing to man the world of God and he is concealing the *a priori* from himself in this "fitness of the mind to receive" it. But it is still God's world. It is not man's, for man cannot help getting it. But Locke did not know this. He has reconciled man's free will and God's omniscience in the matter of getting knowledge of the world, to his own satisfaction.

But there is another phase of the subject. Locke had a scientific purpose to serve. He was a physician. This gave him a practical, experimental attitude toward life. The barrenness of the scholastic doctrines was revealed to him in his profession. In attacking the doctrine of innate ideas he was attacking what he conceived to be the mental attitude that kept men in ignorance of matters of vital concern to their everyday lives. He wishes first to sweep away the doctrine that truth is in the mind, for with this preconception men would not search for it by experiment. Locke's *Essay* has the three aims: to show what is the origin of our ideas; what is the certainty, evidence, and

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, entire.

³ *Ibid.*, sec. 25 (heading).

² *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. i, sec. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 8.

extent of our knowledge; to compel philosophy to abandon what surpasses human comprehension by indicating the limits of its capacity.¹

Both the limitations and the value of his work are largely due to the violence of his attack upon the innate ideas. Challenging his opponents to produce one idea² that may not be had from experience, he sweeps the mind clean, too clean altogether for his own uses, and gives us the *tabula rasa*, the mind absolutely without ideas, and without any way of getting at the world that is not due primarily to the action of that world itself. All the rest of the treatment is handicapped by this initial passivity of the mind. All our ideas of sensation are obtained by the mind in a passive state, by the mere beating of the outward world upon the senses.³ Such a mind can do little in building up such a world as Locke still needs even after he has swept away innate ideas. This appears in many places: first, How are we to know of the existence of the outside world? By the agreement and disagreement of ideas. But are there ideas in the outer world with which ours may agree? Yes. They are in the things.⁴ We copy the idea in the thing with the mind. But how about error? Well, we copy the idea, but the idea is changed in the mind. Then as the idea goes out how can it agree with the idea in the object? There are fixed principles in the mind by which it must get certain ideas. Now, Locke had thought to take away the a priori, the principles that God had placed in the mind as innate ideas, and thus hastily he has restored them in "principles of human nature" so far as many fundamentals are concerned. Locke did not want the world, mental or moral, to go at loose ends, but if each individual is to get his world by experience there must be a hurry-up call to make that experience uniform in some degree. Hence these vague "principles" in the mind, the ideas in the things, the copies, even though changed.

In this matter of copies in the mind being changed after they come from the world,⁵ has not Locke come here very close to another view of the mind than that of the *tabula rasa*? If the ideas are changed in the mind, what changes them and why are they changed? Is it not this that prevents Locke from further discussion of that point, that having placed truth in experience, "out there," he can think of no way to recall it into the mind, into the *tabula rasa*? So I return to my first statement that the limitation of his system is in part due to the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. i, Introduction, sec. 2.

² Entire argument of *ibid.*, Book I.

³ *Ibid.*, Book II, sec. 3; Book IV, sec. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. xxx, sec 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. 3.

violence of his attack on the innate ideas, rendering him unable to give the mind a fair chance in his further discussion. For it seems very clear that but for such intense purpose to destroy innateness to the last vestige and to get knowledge from experience, he might here have found a different definition of knowledge and thus a better conception of the mind. Thus his purpose to destroy the innateness, which seemed to him to detract from the dignity of man by depriving him of free will, has carried him too far and so blinded him to the activity of the mind in knowledge processes.

FURTHER SMUGGLING

The problems of Locke and Hume are in many respects alike. They are both empiricists. In the treatment of space¹ and time they alike smuggle into the argument the a priori which they are combating. This appears in surreptitiously bringing in the "relations."² We get the idea of space by experiencing it in littles. But now the combining activity of the mind is here assumed and ignored. A succession of experiences of points will give us the points, but the experience of the succession is made by the mind, it is not an experience of space in littles. It is a priori. The same thing is true of time. An experience of "nows" will not give us the idea of time without the combining activity of the mind. So Locke and Hume must both beg this question because they think that any a priori is a concession to innateness and, what is more serious, to the critics of the Calvinistic teachings as to free will and to the whole attitude of the individualistic British nation.

Again this difficulty appears in the discussion of primary and secondary qualities by Locke.³ To make the world objectively real seemed essential to Locke as a part of the defeat of idealism. He treats the secondary qualities ideally,⁴ but he then asserts that the primary qualities have objective existence. This was an ark of the covenant, and he urged that no one ever try to deny them their place in the hierarchy of things. But both Berkeley and Hume refused to stop there.

Another begged question is the complex idea of substance. It is one of the famous passages in Locke and need not be recapitulated here. The whole argument was suggested to Locke as a means of refuting the skeptics who denied the existence of spirits. Locke turns the problem the other way and says to the materialist:

¹ *Ibid.*, chap. xiii, sec 4; also Hume, *Works*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 46-54. Edinburgh, 1826.

² *Op. cit.*, Book II, chap. xiv, sec. 17.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. viii, secs. 9 and 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, secs. 10-14.

Neither can you prove the existence of substance. I have, to be sure, knowledge of the group of sensations that I call Gold, but do I have any knowledge of the substratum in which they inhere?

Locke decides that he has no sure knowledge, but holds nevertheless to the belief in the existence of this substratum.¹ Why? The existence cannot be shown under any of the types of knowledge that Locke discusses. It is not intuitively known. It is not demonstrable. It is not revealed by the even less certain sensitive knowledge. Locke knows all this. He dwells on the discussion until it is long, fascinating, conclusive. Then, why does he reject it?

The answer seems to be that that was not the place at which he desired to come out. He wanted things to be real. He had no desire to unseat faith. Suppose he should disprove substance, after taking the secondary qualities into the realm of the ideal. Would not the skeptics triumph, even as Hume did triumph in that very matter of substance? Surely Locke shrank back from the abyss.

TRouble WITH ABSTRACT IDEAS

With Locke there are no genera. Now, he knew that there is no science possible without generalization. Having cast out the genera as smacking of innateness, he makes an effort to account for generalizations that will hold true for science. By way of illustration, Locke asks:

Does it not require some pains to form the general idea of a triangle? (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once.²

Indeed, it does require some pains. It is merely Locke's endeavor to match Hobbes's feat in lifting himself from the particular to the general by means of his boot straps. It is the endeavor to defeat Descartes and at the same time retain all of Descartes that is needed. Particular emphasis should be laid upon the fact that Locke did not need this extreme view at all. He could have got on with George Berkeley's³ notion of the abstracting process. But he seizes the power of abstraction by violence and gets it into the system of empiricism anyway, and so goes farther than need be to make it a fixed thing.

At any rate, at this point, by means of principles of human nature, ideas in the mind and ideas in the object, primary qualities in the things,

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. xxiii.

² *Ibid.*, Book I, Part I, sec. 7.

³ *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, sec. 13.

and substrata to bind the whole, Locke has shown that there is a labyrinthine world and that man has power to wander therein so far as its physical characteristics are concerned. He has satisfied himself as to the source of knowledge.

The second point that Locke declared that he would make clear was the degrees of knowledge.¹ This is a curious expression, "degrees of knowledge," and one wonders again why Locke did not seek a more functional definition of knowledge, for, by any absolute standard of truth, there can surely be no knowledge that is not certain. The trouble is really the "out-there-ness" of the world. It is still God's world wholly. Man can only wander in it. This is Calvinism, the determinism side of it, and when it appears the freewill side always, as here, shades away into the merest ghost of reality. So here Locke has the purpose to keep the world in the sole possession of Deity, and yet seems to try and does try and thinks he has succeeded in sharing it with man by giving him "degrees of certainty" of knowledge. In the end, however, he is obliged, even as Descartes, to rest back upon the character of God for the reality of any of our knowledge.² So much for Locke's endeavor to divide the world of knowledge between Man and God and yet have the world real to each. His purpose has made him select each category, smuggle in the "degrees of knowledge," and at last come out just where Descartes did with the despised innate ideas. How far Locke thinks he has left Descartes! Yet suddenly at the turn of the road the two find themselves together. Has Locke added to the man whom Descartes conceived by leading him through this winding trail to the identical spot before occupied? The contention of this paper is merely that he thought he had and that his purpose has blinded him to the nature of the actual result.

LOCKE'S BASIS OF MORALITY

"The rule prescribed by God is the true and only measure of Morality."³ So speaks our author. This ascribes no moral character to God. Man's goodness is to do the will of God. What, then, is God's goodness? Is it to do his own will? Hobbes, with his willingness to be logical, distinctly says that God has no goodness. His goodness is only his goodness to us. With Hobbes the chief attribute of Deity is power, which is the basis of his rights and of all other rights. Is not the hypothesis of this paper well borne out by this naïve begging of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. ii, sec. 1 (heading).

² *Ibid.*, chap. xviii, sec. 5; also chap. iv, sec. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, II, chap. xxviii, sec. 8.

question of the basis of morality by Locke? There must be in this world of existences and entities, fixed and eternal, a basis for morality outside the changing social processes. The Puritan appeal from priest and potentate was to God as revealed in conscience. Locke summarily sets up this throne.

By an arbitrary arrangement the Deity has joined virtue and happiness together, and vice and misery.¹ What trouble we are in here! Many actions are virtuous that are hard to perform, and vice versa many actions are pleasant that are not virtuous. So Locke begins the task of abstracting from virtuous actions those that produce misery and from vicious actions those that produce pleasure by calling upon man to judge as to whether such and such actions will produce ultimate happiness.

LOCKE'S MAN—MORAL

At this point we come upon the first statement of the free will as conceived by Locke. It is the power to choose between happinesses, the permanent as against the transient.² Man's free will consists in this, but it is limited by a necessity to make some choice. For weal or woe man must choose. To his everlasting joy or to his eternal damnation he must keep moving on through this world that seems to be his own but which really never is. The happiness that makes for his permanent happiness is real (at least it is a part of God's world), that which detracts from this permanent happiness is not real. Thus Locke has made a good that is not a good, namely, the happiness that is not contributory to permanent happiness.³ Again we see his moral purpose making him split hairs.

Then, how large is the assumption of a permanent happiness! How naïvely it is offered as the reason for the belief that men may be expected to come out at the same place in their reasoning on morals. For this is the next step in the train of thought, that morals are demonstrable.⁴ It seems worth while to call attention to the fact that, while even Hobbes

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, chap. iii, sec. 6.

² *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. xxi, sec. 47.

³ His psychology furnished him with no warrant for this. Individualistic psychology cannot do it anyway. So Locke merely asserts that such power exists. His man has no rational fear, as we find in that of Hobbes, nor sympathy as set forth by Hume. So Locke is left to the device named—that of abstracting from the hedonistic attitude the immediate yielding to impulse and this he begs. Surely the hypothesis of this paper gains force from this performance.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. iii, sec. 18.

has attempted some discussion of the affective region of man's nature and Hume discusses it *ad infinitum*, Locke makes slight reference to it. Is it not a part of his simple faith in the Christian religion, with its heaven, its closed revelation in the Bible? The ultimate happiness is to go to heaven. The real happinesses are those that contribute to that end. At any rate, the moral world is synthesized and religion has not suffered.

Perhaps the statement that there is nothing in the psychology of Locke to justify his ascribing to man the power to choose the greater as against the lesser good should be modified in one respect. There is nothing to start him in the self-denial in putting aside the immediate happiness for the more remote but, having so decided, he is assisted by habit.¹ By reason of habit one can come to enjoy the virtuous self-denial, the doing of the task that before was irksome. But is it not also true that habit can make the evil that seemed horrible, good? The fact, of course, is that this individualistic, subjectivistic psychology can never give any valid reason for social conduct. Still it seems surprising that Locke was not more troubled by the question, especially as Hume grappled hard with it later. Presumably, God having fixed the matter, Locke did not feel much concerned to analyze it very far. At any rate, he leaves the subject with the assumption that while habit can function in helping one to enjoy the right thing, which otherwise might be disagreeable, yet it cannot function in making anything right or wrong. It cannot make one hair white or black in the real world of right that God has made and fixed in advance. Among happinesses, some transitory, some permanent, man has no power to omit choice. The high road of righteousness is also the way of permanent happiness. There is no other real world. This is the one fixed and appointed by God for man to walk in, the only real world, God's world.² But it has also blind alleys, or rather it is surrounded by mirages where man may find the transient, though not real, happiness which is not really a part of the world at all.

Thus, in his moral world as in the mental, Locke reconciles man's free will and God's omniscience. That it is no real solution does not concern us. At least Locke has made it necessary for man to put concrete experience into God's world, and that seems to have satisfied him. He has refused to allow man to arrive at truth by a priori processes, and so has made a place for science and morality by means of actual

¹ *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. xxii, sec. 10.

² By the expression "God's world as the only real, and the rest not real," I do not mean anything mystical, but rather that certain courses were there for man to travel. The rest were mistake and loss.

experiment, which was his object. We have seen how carefully he selected his argument to this end, which was our purpose in tracing his line of reasoning.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF LOCKE

With this basis, that virtue is joined with happiness and vice with misery, that morality is demonstrable, Locke has an opportunity to develop a contract theory of society far more to the liking of the Puritan rulers of his day than the contract supposed by Hobbes. It is in all respects biblical. The first state of man was blissful. Men were governed by right reason, as Paul says the patriarchs were. In all this Locke furnished out of his biblical background the original state of nature to the freethinker, Rousseau.

Locke confessed that he wrote his essay on government with the conviction that it would prove a satisfactory defense of the English Revolution.¹ The argument is summarized as follows: The state of nature is mild, governed by benevolent natural law. One man in such a state may rightly come into power over another but not an arbitrary power. Power can rightly be used only to restrain those who "quit the principles of nature," and to obtain reparation of wrong.² Laws of nature are known to "right reason." The difficulty of this state is that in it a man may be judge in his own case. That is likewise the case of monarchs in relation to subjects. The monarch is party to the contract. War is not a condition of nature but a "sedate and settled design upon another man's life," where there is no common superior.³ Such, no doubt, was the case between James II and the English people. Natural liberty is to be free from any personal superior. "The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth."⁴ This consent is indicated by the fact of not removing to another country and starting one's own government. The chief occasion for the establishment of government is the necessity of holding property that develops as society becomes complex. Locke thinks that monarchy arose through the family and partakes of its mild and patriarchal character.⁵

At this point does not Locke's purpose loom large as the variant of his theory? Society is to establish the state, whose business it is to enforce the part of truth that is demonstrable. In illustrating the method of demonstrating morality, Locke starts the demonstration with the

¹ *Works*, IV (London, 1794; 9th ed.), 209.

² *Ibid.*, p. 343. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 351. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 347. ⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. vi.

word "justice."¹ When he unfolds his evolution of the state of society from the blissful state of nature, he dwells long and prolixly on the difficulties that come into the state of nature by reason of property. One might even think that the original difficulty between Eve and the snake was a property one, and the possession of the apple illustrated quarrels over property, making it truly the original "apple of discord." Locke, then, names the first function of government that of the defense of property rights, that of "justice"—the first term of his original syllogism in demonstrating morality and so bringing it under the class of things that can be surely known. This provides for the defense of the truth, while leaving free to the individual judgment that part of our ideas that lie beyond "the extent of knowledge," for Locke was interested in the extent of knowledge as greatly as in its certainty.

The law of right reason, morality, was there waiting even under the reign of the state of nature, but it could not function, for there was nothing to work upon. As disagreement arose because of property, then, the law of morality could not function directly because of bias, interest. Hence in order to put some power into the law of right reason, morality, these interfering things, bias, interest, must be abstracted from the entire situation. Now, such things as bias, interest, are active, while the right reason, abstracted from such interest, is cold, repressive. Locke did not want to destroy the power of the interests in men to receive gratification so far as legitimate. So he narrows the sphere of the government to the enforcement of only the part of the law of right reason that is necessary to preserve order. This part he conceived to be the matter of property. Was it so true in Locke's day that economic difficulties were the only difficulties? It seems possible that Locke so conceived because he saw no other way for the larger exercise of freedom that he sought for his people.

At any rate, he is responsible for the beginnings of the philosophy that made the strange theories of the physiocrats possible, reminding one of the quip of the humorist: "That's the beauty of science. It gives such large returns in conjecture for the small amount of facts invested." Seriously, has there been a time when a man, not bent on a theory, could maintain that the only problems of society are economic? Despite Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Debs, I venture to doubt it. I do not mean that a large part of the difficulties have not been economic. Doubtless it has been true that the struggle for food has been very intense, but in the unfolding of human experience, even in the time of the

¹ *Ibid.*, chap. v.

Greeks, other values have arisen, evident to one who would look, and implied in the discussion of all these great teachers.

LOCKE'S TREATMENT OF TOLERATION

In his psychology and moral science, Locke has now laid the foundation for his treatment of toleration. On the one hand, he has placed his proof of the existence of God, the doing of whose will is the chief end of man.¹ Besides this he has a demonstrated, or has begun the demonstration of, morality. On the other hand, he has shown that there are limits to knowledge beyond which our ideas go. That is, there is a realm where final judgment cannot be rendered.² On the one hand, is toleration bounded by the necessity not to tolerate atheism or immorality. On the other, there is the realm of the uncertain, the morally "indifferent." Locke's discussion of the subject was largely concerned with the question of forms of worship, and his whole attitude as to the subject is that of one who regards the Bible as giving infallible guidance in essentials of worship. He assumes that the realm of what is "indifferent" is easily known, because morality is demonstrable. What is not demonstrably wrong is to be permitted.

THE THINGS THAT LOCKE TREATS BUT NOT WHOLLY FUNCTIONALLY

These are habit and custom. Locke's very method of abstracting from things complex ideas, to find the eternal substance prevents his making use of these categories in his system. They are not simple. They do not inhere in an essence. They change; therefore they are not. Custom, habit, are neither right nor wrong in themselves. They may hold a relation to pleasure and pain, however. In that part of the system they may function.

As this part of Locke's work has not been generally commented upon, I append several quotations from Locke.

HABIT IN LOCKE FUNCTIONAL IN NON-ESSENTIALS

In discussing perception he recognizes the value of habit in forwarding that act.³ Again in discussing power he says that we can change the agreeableness and disagreeableness of things by habit.⁴ Again and most striking of all he says:

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book IV, chap. x, secs. 1-3.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xiv, sec. 3.

³ *Essay on Human Understanding*, Book III, chap. ix, secs. 9 and 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. xxi, sec. 69.

The reason we have not always corresponding words in different languages is that the several fashions, customs and manners of one nation making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one which another people have had never any occasion to make or perhaps so much as taken notice of names come of course to be annexed to them to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation.¹

Again:

For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them, without which laws could be but ill-made or vice and disorder repressed . . . and the Greeks call confidence of speaking by a peculiar name. Which power or ability in man, of doing anything when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name habit.²

Following the discussion of true and false ideas, Locke uses the term "association of ideas" for the first time so far as known to the writer, in the history of philosophy.³ The sum of this argument is that we err in our thinking by associating the wrong ideas. This may become even madness, according to Locke. There are then many right and many wrong ways in which ideas may be associated. The right ways are already outlined above. What is interesting to us at this point is that besides madness, the fundamentally wrong way of associating ideas, Locke recognizes others due to habit and custom.

In section 5, he says:

Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connection one with another: it is the office of the excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded on their *peculiar beings*. Besides this there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to *chance* or *custom*, ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them.⁴

Section 6:

This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance and hence it comes in different men to be very different according to their different inclinations, education, *interests*, etc. *Custom* settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and motions in the body.

¹ *Ibid.*, chap. xxii, sec. 6.

² *Ibid.*, sec. 10. Thus habit functions except in essentials, the things fixed by God. There habit and custom cannot enter.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. xxxiii (entire).

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 5.

Section 7:

That there are such associations of them made by custom in the minds of most men, I think nobody will question, who has well considered himself or others, and to this might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural.

This is the dualism of science and experience.

In this connection, chapters xxxii and xxxiii, of Book II, discuss two things: Chapter xxxii is a discussion of "True and False Ideas," though Locke hastens to state that truth and falsehood properly belong to propositions.¹ However, with this correction he summarizes chapter xxxiii, section 25, "Ideas When False," as follows:

To conclude, a man having no notion of anything without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases) he may indeed make an idea neither answering the reason of things, nor agreeing to the idea commonly signified by other people's word, but cannot make a wrong or false idea of a thing, which is not otherwise known to him but by the idea he has of it. . . . When I frame an idea of the legs, arms and body of a man, and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a false idea of anything; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a man or Tartar, and imagine it to represent some real being without me, or to be the same idea that others call by the same name; in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a false idea, though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental proposition wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence or the name man or Tartar belong to it, I will call it man or Tartar I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment, nor the idea in any way false.²

What makes one idea valid and another not? Locke begs the question. Just as he begs the question of substance, after producing an unanswerable argument against it, so here he begs the question of true and false ideas. He thinks the fundamental ideas are true. One can establish these by the longer look. How long a look? Locke has passed by one thing with a mere mention that he might have used with tremendous weight—that of custom. Why not custom its own validity? How do customs arise?³

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. xxxii, sec. 1.

² *Ibid.*, Book II, chap. xxxiii, sec. 25.

³ William Graham Sumner, *Folkways*. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1911.

Had it not been for the necessities of his system, how easy would it have been for Locke to find some of the validity of our thinking in this very custom which is at this point only blamed for the unfortunate associations of ideas? Of course, this discussion of Locke's does not deny the possibility that the customary association may be the right association (otherwise our ideas might be expected usually to run amuck), but there is no hint of making custom function as one of the legitimate factors in establishing the association.

In another connection we find Locke mentioning the power of habit to make pleasant that which has been unpleasant.¹ He thinks that this power should assist one in forming virtuous habits, but he does not hint that habit has any part in rendering the action virtuous.

Locke would have been helped in his interpretation of the function of custom had he realized its significance for the three kinds of law which he distinguishes: (1) divine law, (2) civil law, (3) philosophical law.²

Under the latter head he says:

Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right or wrong; and as far as they really are so applied, they are so far coincident with the divine law above mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible that these names virtue and vice, in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of the world, are constantly attributed to those actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange that men everywhere should give the name of virtue to those actions which among them are judged praiseworthy; and call that vice which they account blamable; since otherwise they would condemn themselves if they should think anything right which they allowed not commendation; anything wrong which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and vice is the approbation or dislike praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes and clubs of men in the world. . . . Perhaps *by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interests of different sorts of men*,³ it fell out that what was thought praiseworthy in one place escaped not censure in another, etc.⁴

Do we not approach close to the higher criticism of the basis of ethics in the foregoing from our philosopher? In the latter part of the foregoing paragraph he comes yet closer to the reasons why the custom of a given

¹ *Works*, Book II, chap. xxi, sec. 69.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xxviii, sec. 7.

³ Italics mine.

⁴ *Works*, Book II, chap. xxviii, sec. 10.

society comes to be regarded as the voice of God and to carry a divine sanction. He puts the case almost as vividly as does Professor James when he speaks of the terrible sufferings of one who is censured by his group:

No man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought and have been reconciled to but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance, and he must be made of irreconcilable contradictions who can take pleasure in company and yet be insensible of disgrace and contempt from his companions.²

Of course Locke is estopped from carrying this argument farther. With him God's laws are the real laws. And so he must drop his suggestive category of custom and the excellent statement of the molding power of the group over the individual. His course has this advantage, however, that it leaves this category for later thinkers to put in its correct place.

Could Locke, who believed that evil and good are absolute, by any possibility bring the three categories—God's law, civil law, custom—into his system? No. He must leave them wandering loose, although he had already pointed out that habit may affect the matter of pleasure and pain in which all good lies, according to his system. But, obviously, there was a happiness that was not happiness, a good that was not good. So it is with all hedonism that has any absolute for its goal.

THE ATTAINMENT OF LOCKE'S PURPOSE

Again, as in the case of Hobbes, we find that by the establishment of his science our author has attained his goal. Accept the limits that he has placed upon government, the bound he has set between his individual and the state, and all is well. There will be toleration of religion and all else that does not interfere with the welfare of the whole. The church is set in its place as a guide to heaven. The state has lost its repressive character. The individual with the divine right to worship God after the dictates of his conscience has come into view. Further, he may resist aggression on the part of the government, for aggression

² *Essay on Human Understanding*, Book II, chap. xxviii, secs. 9-13.

is demonstrably immoral. Further still, the state need not tolerate atheists, for they are by nature antisocial.

LOCKE'S PURPOSE THE VARIANT OF HIS THEORY

In this movement from psychology, through morals, to political science, what do we note?

1. Locke has begged the following questions: The certainty of any knowledge. He did this by placing the ideas in the object. He says that the ideas of sensation come to the mind in its passive condition, but later speaks of the power to take a longer look, which would apply even to cases of sensation.

2. He stresses pluralism, and neutralizes it with parallelism. He is sure that the moral law is demonstrable, but does not carry the demonstration far. He overestimates the economic element in social struggle, which is the means of making his first term in the first syllogism of his demonstration of morality very simple and comprehensible. His argument for the existence of Deity is merely formal. It really begs the question of a first cause.

3. From happiness, the only good, are abstracted the happinesses that hinder real happiness.

4. The entity of toleration rests upon a basis of intolerance at one end and terminates in the vague "indifferent" at the other.

5. Habit and custom function in some places and in others do not.

SUMMARY OF LOCKE'S PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMENT SHOWING THAT THE PURPOSE WAS THE VARIANT

There are no innate ideas; no innate truths, maxims or principles; no other sources of knowledge but sensation for external things, and reflection for what takes place within us. Consequently it is impossible to know anything outside of what experience, be it external or internal, furnishes us. Philosophy must abandon the transcendent problems of substance, essence, and the inner constitution of things, as well as all methods except observation, induction and experience. The soul exists, but we cannot know whether its essence is material or immaterial. The freedom of indifference is denied. God exists but we know nothing of his nature. Outside of us exist solidity, extension, figure and motion as primary qualities.¹

There is the whole revolutionary doctrine. But his contemporaries may rest assured that the violence of the attack on innateness shall not be permitted to undermine science or society, for Locke will here beg

¹ Portion of summary of Locke's theory taken from Weber's *History of Philosophy* (authorized transl. by Frank Thilly), p. 389. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908.

the following: The essences exist, even if not knowable; there are "principles of human nature" by which we can get into touch with the real world so far as necessary. These he begs in order to assist the *tabula rasa*. He attaches happiness to the ideas we have of things as a guide to wandering man. He demonstrates the existence of God that the argument may not lead him to the necessity of tolerating atheists. He likewise demonstrates morality, postulated on very narrow conception of its nature. He finds a state of nature like that of Eden and so establishes the throne of William and Mary and the share that the individual has always in all government.

CHAPTER IV

DAVID HUME

The study of the reactions of this man to the different events of his life is especially illuminating for the purpose of this paper. Fortunately for our study he wrote a short autobiography.¹ He reveals that he had in youth a little money and a passion for literature. He even wrote poetry. The possession of a small patrimony not only gave him leisure to indulge his tastes but allowed him the boast that he "never preferred a request to one great man, nor made any advances of friendship to any of them."²

When at the age of twenty-eight he published his *Treatise of Human Nature* he says that it "fell dead from the press."³ He admits that he was somewhat depressed by the indifference of the public, and we may suspect that he was a great deal more disappointed by this misfortune than he admits, for the *Enquiry* was written to popularize the *Treatise* doctrine. To the storms of criticism from "Reverends and Right Reverends" he put on the armor of indifference at least before the public, when he says that he had resolved never to reply to anybody, and he puts on an appearance of contempt by the remark that "these symptoms of rising reputation gave me encouragement."⁴ So true it is that the attention of the enemy is to be preferred to his indifference.

In 1774, Hume's friends sought to have him chosen to a chair of ethics and pneumatic philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Hume says in a letter to William Mure: "The accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, atheism, etc., etc., etc., was started against me but never took, being borne down by the good company in town."⁵ Obviously, Hume enjoyed and delighted in the good opinion of the "good company." Later in his life the good fellows were less able to defend him in the warfare that was waged upon him by the churchmen. It is to men of their own class that he looks with gratitude when he says that after the outcry from all classes against his *History*, he received from the primate of England, Dr. Herring, and the primate of Ireland, Dr. Stone, "which seem to me two rather odd exceptions," messages not to be

¹ "My Own Life," *Works*, I (Edinburgh, 1826), iii-xv.

² *Ibid.*, p. xii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. v.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁵ Mentioned in Hurley's *Life of Hume*, p. 24. New York: Harper and Bros.

discouraged.¹ It is quite a help when one wins over even a portion of the enemy. But the depth of Hume's discouragement was evidenced by the statement that "had not the war been at that time breaking out between France and England, I had certainly retired to some provincial town of the former kingdom, have changed my name, and never more have returned to my native country."²

Certainly censure even from those whom he seemed willing to antagonize has well-nigh done its work. But his fighting quality remained strong, for

I was so little inclined to yield to their senseless clamour, that in above a hundred alterations which further study, reading or reflection engaged me to make in the reigns of the two first Stuarts, I have made them all invariably to the Tory side.

He then adds his general defense: "It is ridiculous to consider the English Constitution before that period as a regular plan of liberty."³ Whether the favor of his Tory friends supported him in his appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober, certain it is that his "choir invisible," the future company of scholars, have indorsed his work.

The censure of his foes did, however, seem not without its effect. He felt that his *Treatise on Natural Religion* would help to establish Christianity, and certainly the pulpit has made abundant use of his argument in that *Treatise* without giving him credit.

Did Hume think himself a heretic, an atheist? At least we have no hint that he did not think himself fitted to teach ethics and philosophy to the youth in Edinburgh. Huxley, indeed, indulges in some mild irony at the expense of the "good fellows" of the town who defended Hume on the occasion mentioned before. Huxley is loath to believe that Hume was so inconsistent as to believe both the *Treatise* and at the same time believe in the miracles of the Bible, but few men have allowed the purpose to be the variant more than Huxley has in his discussion of Hume.

Huxley tries to convince his readers that when Hume said to a Mr. Boyle who came to console with him on the death of his mother that he threw his speculations out to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things he did not believe so differently from the rest of the world as his guest imagined, he was trying to get rid of a bore. Yet it seems as if he sincerely believed that he could believe the *Treatise*, the *Treatise on Natural Religion*, and still be a Christian believer. Further, there does seem to me to be an aperture by which he can escape

¹ *Works*, I, x.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

the charge of inconsistency. At any rate, the power of the Calvinistic teachings upon him was probably greater than Huxley could estimate. At least that such a scholar and scientist was sincere seems antecedently probable. In all this I do not mean to be understood as saying that Hume made no concessions in his work to the church people. On the contrary, he made substantial ones, but they appear in the *Enquiry* and in the argument on miracles, which has already been referred to.

In youth he spent some time in France. In later years he was in an official position at Paris, and says that there is a "real satisfaction in living at Paris, from the great number of sensible, knowing and polite company with which the city abounds above all places in the universe. I thought once of settling there for life."¹ But hardly shall a good Scotchman escape the lure of his native land. In his will he provides that if he shall die anywhere in Scotland he shall be buried in a private manner in the Calton churchyard, and that his monument shall cost not more than £100, and bear only his name, "leaving it to posterity to do the rest."² Thus like every poet, scholar, statesman, philosopher, he leaves the final verdict on his work to the "great cloud of witnesses" yet to come. To Dr. Adam Smith, his executor, he leaves his manuscripts with instruction to destroy those that are not the product of the past five years, with injunction to publish the *Dialogues on Natural Religion* which were, he hoped, to be a help to "our blessed religion."³ Did he not still love the church? Did he not hope to help establish the faith whose spirit brooded over the days of his boyhood? Hardly shall any man escape the trace of such influence. This last will and testament together with the autobiography makes one of the most human documents in all the archives of literature, showing this skeptic one of the most kindly, sweet, strong souls in all history. It needs only the story of his last days written by his friend Adam Smith to round out the pleasing picture.⁴

In the Introduction to the *Treatise of Human Nature* Hume declares that if he have good fortune with the public he will later write of morals, politics, and criticism. That much in the "advertisement."⁵ He then says that all the sciences have a relation, great or less, to human nature; that even mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; that it is impossible

¹ "My Own Life," *Works*, I, xii-xiii.

² "Latter Will and Testament," *ibid.*, p. xxix.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

⁴ "Letter from Dr. Adam Smith," *Works*, pp. xvi-xxv.

⁵ *Works*, I, 3.

to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ and the operations we perform in our reasoning.¹ Here is at the beginning the frank recognition that science is *one*; that it has man for its center and his service as its aim. This is the excuse for abstract science, always, that it may fix boundaries to practical science. Locke, with his world mechanically tied together with existences and substances, with his demonstrable moral law, his contractual conception of society, had left a problem altogether too tempting to be passed over by this eager scholar. The whole attitude of the society in which Hume lived was antagonistic to the metes and bounds set by Locke in his puritanic position. With the serious ambitions of a gifted young man, Hume set to work to attack the problem of knowledge where Locke had left it. When he had completed his task, he had withdrawn the outer world, whose existence Locke had begged in his discussions concerning existence, primary qualities, and substance, into the subjective world, and then had destroyed the powers of the mind by which any world had being.

At the end of the fascinating argument he has left as a test of truth only one thing, and that is the matter of *feeling*. The idea to which we assent *feels* different from that to which we refuse assent.² Here was an excellent cue from which to go on. Why does a true idea feel different? Is it not in relation to the whole activity, and is not that activity purposive? In fact, more than once in his work Hume is close to this interpretation: Thus he says that nature "points out to everyone those simple ideas that are most proper to be united into a complex one."³ But, we insistently inquire, why proper to be united? To what end? Again Hume says that there is a "kind of attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural."⁴ Why attraction among ideas? Attraction to what end? Whose end is served thereby, if any? Hume felt this when he said in Book I of the *Treatise*, section 7, discussing abstract ideas, "this application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purpose of life."⁵ Thus is Hume, even as Hobbes and Locke, dropping remarks by the way what would have given him a different interpretation of the mind had he not started with Locke's assumption

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, Part III, secs. x-xiv.

³ *Ibid.*, Part I, sec. iv.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. vii.

that the mind is furnished with ready-made impressions and that these are the real to which man must adjust his life. But Hume reduced thinking to habit, and this is his trouble. The point at which Hume attacked Locke, that of the complex idea of substance, is well known and need detain us but a moment. Hume said in substance: "You have made up the idea of substance out of the qualities. The moment you go beyond what is given you have cause and effect." Then follows the long argument in which he reduces the idea of cause and effect to an "incontrollable inference" due to habit. Thus all thinking becomes habit and there is no test of truth except feeling.¹ The criticism of the faculties themselves, as before observed, reveals their weakness as too great to give us truth.² This is going on from Locke with a vengeance. But Hume did not regard his resolution of thinking into habit as an altogether destructive process, and, as I once heard Professor Moore³ point out, had he regarded habit as the racial as well as the individual habit, he would not have been so far wrong.

HUME'S SUPREME NEED

Hume's supreme need was a new definition of knowledge, but he is estopped from reaching it. He has already accepted Locke's. The world belongs to God. It rests altogether in the agreement and disagreement of ideas, and these come, we know not how, from God. Thus at once we come upon the Calvinistic heritage of Hume. This appears in the fact that in passing from the second to the third part of the *Treatise* he passes from having ideas to having knowledge and is never once aware of the fact.⁴ Why did not the enormous gap between having ideas and having knowledge appeal to him? Undoubtedly because of the Calvinistic presupposition as to the nature of truth. Truth is fixed; it belongs to the infinite. We, as human beings, having nothing to do with it. We will then get rid of the trouble and place such knowledge (belief only) in feeling.

That Hume did not reach a new definition of knowledge was due to the purpose which was the variant of his theory. It must have lain in his mind somewhat as follows: (1) We have impressions. (2) These are lively and we assent to them as true. Thus belief we have. Let us trace the process by which we come to believe. (3) Knowledge in an absolute sense we do not and cannot have. Let it be left out of the consideration. In this general point of view Hume was in a position to

¹ *Ibid.*, Part III (entire).

³ Addison W. Moore, in unpublished lectures.

² *Ibid.*, Part II (entire).

⁴ *Works*, Vol. I, Part III, sec. i.

get a new, a functional and social, definition of knowledge. In showing that I must enter a little into detail, and I trust that no one keenly interested in the hypothesis of this study will fail to see at the close of the examination that all that is written is relevant and that I have not by inadvertence been making a criticism of Hume's philosophy as such.

1. Having accepted the definition of knowledge given by Locke, the agreement and disagreement of ideas, Hume states that we have perceptions and that these take two forms—impressions and ideas. The distinction is that the impressions are lively. They include "all sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul."¹ Ideas are less lively. They are the "faint images" of the impressions.² Imagination may separate the ideas and unite them in such ways as it pleases.³ Now we are close to the crux of the matter. Why not here declare some reason for uniting ideas that has some relation to human need? But Hume passes over his opportunity. He places the uniting principles in the ideas themselves in as mystic a way as ever was done by medieval monk. Nature has pointed out those simple ideas that are most proper to be united into a complex one.

This leaves the world outside of man's experience except as, like Locke's man, he wanders in it. So when Hume passes from the discussion of having ideas to having knowledge, he is merely passing to the consideration of how complex ideas come to have the liveliness of impressions and so force belief upon the mind.

In Part III, "Knowledge and Probability," we learn how we come to assent to any ideas as true. This comes about in the case of any idea which approaches the liveliness that attaches to an impression. Belief consists in the *manner* of conceiving an idea. Belief is a "lively idea related to or associated with a present impression." What I am here calling attention to is that all this discussion is found under the part of the *Treatise*, Part III, entitled "Knowledge and Probability." He finally rests his whole case for this sort of "knowledge" on the matter of cause and effect. His last sentence in the paragraph is: "There enters into this operation of the mind [cause and effect operation] but a present impression, a lively idea, and a relation or association in the fancy betwixt the impression and idea."⁴ The consideration of Part IV will make clear my contention that Hume is near to a definition of knowledge altogether different from the agreement of ideas and one that would

¹ *Op. cit.*, Part I, sec. i.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Works*, Vol. I, Part I, sec. iii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Part III, sec. viii.

have cleared up the confusion as to belief and knowledge, between which he draws no clear line.

In Part IV we find that while all the rules of demonstrative sciences are "certain and infallible, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them."¹ So after every operation we must check our judgment or "belief." Belief? Are we not talking about knowledge? Again and again the word "belief" is used. Where is knowledge of which we are supposed to speak? "... 'Tis in vain to ask whether there be body or not." That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasoning.²

Is it not plain, then, that Hume's skepticism is due to a definition of knowledge that does not cover all his treatment? He speaks of having ideas and then talks of having knowledge without knowing that he has passed over from one to the other. Is not this a tremendous leap? Can he unconsciously have taken it, except that he must not remove some presupposition or must serve some purpose already conceived as a goal? Undoubtedly both, as I believe.

The prepossession is the nature of truth as conceived by all philosophy, and especially by his Calvinistic group, as something fixed. Now, he has had many chances to fasten upon some functional and social definition of knowledge all along. "The attraction of ideas, what else does that mean? Nature, by an absolute and incontrollable necessity has determined us to pledge as well as to breathe and feel."³ What does that mean, unless we are to say that the belief arises in the process of some activity? Further, when he calls in the agreement of others in order to establish a belief even in a mathematical demonstration, is he not near to a definition of knowledge that shall have to do with the forwarding of *social* processes, a social definition of knowledge?

2. Now for the second part of the explanation—that he had a way out of the difficulty more to his liking, more in accord with his purpose. I am here supposing that Hume intended to give *feeling* its place in philosophy, as a condition precedent to giving it its place in the social process in general. He will have escaped the trouble about his definition of knowledge by giving feeling its place in thinking preparatory to giving it a place in his moral science, in his hedonism.

Does it not all grow clear when we reflect that he has everywhere considered every point in its effect on feeling? Liveliness of feeling discriminates impressions from ideas. Feeling discriminates the ideas to which we assent from the one that we refuse to believe. Feeling

¹ *Ibid.*, Part IV, sec. i.

² *Ibid.*, sec. ii.

³ *Ibid.*, sec. i.

comes in to make us believe even the most abstract mathematical calculation, by making belief wait upon the agreement of the group and so raise the idea to the liveliness of the impression.

I have here closed this part of the argument, showing that Hume's purpose prevented him from one definition of knowledge and urged him on to another—that of belief due to feeling. But not all the variant that is involved in this part of Hume has by any means been exhausted.

I here point out that the agreement of the group to fix a process of reasoning in the convictions of its author is, in some degree at least, not justified by Hume's previous reasoning. I shall endeavor to show not only that this statement is true, but that the fact illustrates again that Hume's general purpose is variant of his theory at this point. How do we get at cause and effect? By recurrence, by habit in the things begetting in the mind an "incontrollable inference." The mathematician, seeing two objects together with two other objects equaling four, and seeing it again and again, by reason of the liveliness of the idea raising it to the liveliness of an impression, believes that two and two will always make four. Now, this is accomplished by means of the imagination. But for some unexplained reason, Hume seems to think that this process, alone and unaided, is not sufficient to retain in the mind the conviction of the truth of the results of the process. So he appeals to something else, also resting upon feeling to reinforce the imagination in order that conviction of the correctness of a mathematical demonstration may remain and become a social possession. This is the agreement of the group before referred to. Thus we read:

There is no algebraist or mathematician so expert in his science as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately on his discovery of it, or regard it as anything but a mere probability. Every time he runs over his proofs, his confidence increases; but still more by the approbation of his friend and is raised to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and applause of the learned world.¹

My assertion is that Hume has jumped a point to give us this social agreement as a ground of belief. I do not question that he is right as to the fact. I merely assert that he has added one kind of feeling to another kind of feeling in a way unwarranted by his treatment. Here is my objection: We think by habit. Granted. Habit gives us an "incontrollable inference." But if it can be shaken by lapse of time or needs any agreement of the group to establish it, then we do not think by habit. We get something else besides this inference in belief, if the belief is to be

¹ *Human Understanding*, Part IV, sec. i.

at all valuable. In other words, if Hume but knew it, we believe that which is socially true, that which helps in the on-going of the social life. But you cannot get group agreement into knowledge (belief) by any agreement of ideas.

But now once more how efficiently does this variant help him in the moral determinism that he is about to establish on feeling pure and simple! He has produced what we may call a hedonic theory of thought. And it works. It spreads and makes beliefs a common possession. He will now pass on to establish morality on a like common possession of feeling—the feeling of sympathy. How otherwise could Hume have thought that the feeling which makes us infer from cause to effect was in any sense the same or could perform the same function as the agreement of the group after the demonstration of a mathematical formula?

To summarize: (1) The whole presupposition of philosophy and of religion made truth a fixed thing, something that could be effected in its essence by no activity of the mind. Hume could conceive of no other truth as really truth. (2) Knowledge is of truth. Now, Hume can see no power in the mind to find this sure and fixed truth. For here, as pointed out, he has passed from having ideas to having knowledge. (3) So, in thinking, he can find nothing else to do but to pass over to the imagination in order to fix belief, leaving truth to take care of itself. This gives him his hedonic view of the process of thought. But he might have taken a social view, a functional view, but for the fact that knowledge was assumed to be of things fixed. The agreement of the group which he here stumbles upon would have helped him.

Now, in a hedonic view of thinking, agreement of the group might easily be smuggled in as Hume smuggled it. It is not the same kind of feeling that Hume found in cause and effect, namely, habit from recurrence, but it is *feeling*, and the resemblance is close enough to make use of and close enough to prevent Hume from any inkling of any functional view of thinking. And it gives feeling validity. If now we can find certain feelings always common to all men, we have the basis of common life. Individualism will thus produce society.

HUME'S SYSTEM OF MORALS

The chief catagory upon which Hume depends to secure a social individual is that of sympathy.¹ In the *Enquiry* he brings in a new problem: It is why utility pleases.² In discussion of this he tries to find a way from the social interest back to the individual. This is a reversal of the

¹ *Works*, Vol. II, Part II, sec. v, p. 103.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Parts I and II.

procedure in the *Treatise*, and is notable as showing that Hume felt definitely that his system got its validity from its usefulness to society. Hence he puts society into the foreground.

He tries by a long analysis to discover why we may expect to find sympathy pleasant wherever there is utility.

There is no other course open to Hume. Having reduced the test of truth to a feeling basis, he must find social feeling in a substratum somewhere or his system becomes useless to the social process which he seeks to promote.

In the *Enquiry concerning Morals* he paves the way for the final introduction of sympathy as the open sesame to the social life by the following:

The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, etc., that which renders morality an active principle, etc., depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species."¹

To find at once the meat in the cocoanut, let us quote the question propounded with evident expectation that the answer is self-evidently a negative in section 5: "Would any man, walking alone, tread as willingly on another's toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard and flinty pavement?"² The true answer is "Yes!" Many an impish fellow for any one of many reasons would do just that and Hume knew it. We are not obliged to assume complete simplicity even in a philosopher. But further, all along, as I show, Hume brings into view considerations that are equally valid with sympathy for making man social and never uses them. In order to locate the sympathy, Hume is always trying to create a vacuum in which it is to act. Thus, "Popular sedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to factious leaders are some of the most visible though less laudable effects of this social sympathy."³ Why "less laudable"? Are they not manifestations of sympathy in its purest form?

Again, Hume says that in estimating the merits of a statesman we have to regard the good he achieves for his own country and disregard the prejudice which he brings on its enemies and rivals.⁴ Without mentioning that this is not wholly true, we seek where sympathy functions toward the enemy. Here Hume has stumbled upon the instinct of hostility toward the outer group, which is as social a passion as any other, but he merely casts it aside. Again, he maintains that while we

¹ *Op. cit.*, sec. i, p. 241.

² *Works*, IV, 298.

³ *Ibid.*, sec. v.

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. v, p. 302.

regard the tendencies of actions and characters, not their real accidental consequences in our moral determination, . . . yet we cannot help paying greater regard to one whose station joined to virtue renders him really useful to society, than to one who exerts the social virtues only in good intentions and benevolent affections.¹

It would seem that efficiency counts.

In this discussion, I do not mean to say that Hume has not built his bridge, a narrow one, to be sure, and one that may easily break down in any serious crisis, from his subjectivistic psychology to a social individual. But what a mass of rich material he has discarded as mere rubbish in the construction. Here are leadership and obedient subordination, group struggle, interest, all magnificent categories left to find their way in or out as the case may be, but never functioning, always logging the process.

HUME'S CONCEPTION OF UTILITY

Hume's idea of utility helped him to his large overvaluation of sympathy, and at the same time the hypothesis of this paper is borne out by the fact. Utility is the character of that which contributes directly to happiness.² Now, that quality can be surely ascribed only to that which has been tested and is known so to contribute. Hume's conception does not deal, then, nor is he able to deal, with those situations in which the utility thing is coming into existence through crisis, disagreement, resulting agreement, and the establishment of the utility institution. This helps me in my contention that it is the immediate social situation, postulated as permanent, that is ever in his mind and becomes the variant of the theory. To retain this connection between utility and happiness was the supreme difficulty of Mill.

HUME'S AESTHETICS

It is worthy of note that Hume discusses the foregoing topic. Locke did not have it. In Hume's day standards of taste were real questions. The aesthetic was regnant in the public life. As Hume had gone so far in making feeling the basis of morality and in general was so subjectivistic in his treatment, he found it necessary to distinguish between grades of happiness.³ In his essay on *Delicacy of Taste* he creates this category of grades of happiness.⁴ His emphasis is natural to his whole outlook and purpose. In a day when heaven is farther away, political concerns easy, the labor problem yet in the future, the hedonic categories are

¹ *Ibid.*, footnote.

³ *Of the Standard of Taste*, Vol. III, Essay XXIII.

² *Works*, Vol. IV, sec. v.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Essay I.

called for. With Locke it was not necessary to dwell upon happiness, as the main happiness was to get to heaven and the moral problem was well to the fore. But in Hume's day the earth was an attractive place, at least for many classes. His task was to break up old conditions of a narrow and prejudiced morality and give a place for enjoyment of all the activities of the mind and body. This refinement of happiness was a part of his task and is characteristic of his whole purpose. In fact, it is one of its most striking manifestations, and there is something pleasing about it. It was a repudiation of sensualism and an endeavor to place his hedonism on a high plane.

Again, in his treatment of aesthetics appears his dualism between the natural and the acquired.¹ There is natural beauty, but it may not operate to produce joy in a given case because of the dulness of the beholder or because of custom. But why cannot custom swallow the whole of natural beauty? Why cannot "natural" beauty arise wholly from custom? Here custom is merely a clog upon beauty. Is not this refinement of taste that allows one to cultivate the higher grades of pleasure really a matter of custom? If so, why is there a higher and a lower? Does Hume shrink from allowing custom to function here, and in so doing does he not make aesthetics a sort of morality? As appears later he nearly identifies them in direct statement. Beauty with Hume is the most unbending of all the entities. Custom, habit, function in the fullest degree in thinking, but in aesthetics far less. Beauty is an imperial goddess who can pull the world of morality this way and that, but she herself is never moved. She is merely veiled from the sight of those whose senses are rendered dull by congenital stupidity or blinded by custom.

HUME'S POLITICAL SCIENCE

On the basis of his psychology, Hume felt called upon to discuss the origin of the state and the function of government. Justice, he argues, is an artifice.² By a long analysis he gets back to his principle of sympathy associated with utility per se as the basis of society. No action can be morally good unless there be a motive to produce it apart from its morality. What, then, is the motive to establish justice? There is no such passion as love for mankind in general apart from personal qualities, services, or relations to ourselves. The first basis of union is love between the sexes. Then love of parents toward children. Then,

¹ *Op. cit.*, Essay XXIII, p. 276.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, Essay V.

custom and habit operating on the tender minds of children make them sensible of the advantages of society as well as fashioning them for it. While selfishness is the greatest barrier to society, yet it is not so great as has been claimed. We love some, esteem others and extend a weak affection to strangers and indifferent people. This partiality not only influences our conduct but also our judgments as to vice and virtue.¹

Our natural uncultivated ideas of morality confirm our partialities. So by artifice we remedy the condition. We find by experience that it is over property that men quarrel and so we establish society for the protection of it. Hence society is not founded, as Hobbes said, upon the eternal obligation of promise. The order was this: property, right, obligation.

Property being arranged, there is not much left to do. "All other passions besides this of interest are either easily restrained, or not of such pernicious consequence when indulged," a curious statement whose explanation is by no means clear. Apparently it would give aid and comfort to the socialists. But it is of a piece with Hume's whole attitude of seeking for men calm enjoyment and contemplation as the *summum bonum*. In his day a great many questions had not arisen or he could not have so naïvely said: "Other passions . . . are not of such pernicious consequence."

Justice is classed as an artificial virtue. But society and the state have then arisen partly by reason of artificial and partly by reason of natural virtues. The economic interpretation again comes in to limit the sphere of government and Hume makes this limit the most pronounced of any thinker of first rank among political scientists, saying that "all the fleets and armies exist merely for the support of the twelve judges."² But surely this, too, is of a piece with his whole conception, his whole purpose, to give to happiness the largest validity possible. Custom has a share in establishing the legitimacy of the existing forms of government because of the ease that it gives to activities and the uneasiness attached to any endeavor to break them down.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUME

We find our author anticipating his friend Adam Smith and giving us the beginning of the science of political economy. It is pleasing to find how little *laissez faire* is justified by his system, which has been called the "cradle of political economy." Of the usual topics of this subject he discusses commerce, the refinement of the arts, money, interest, balance of trade, balance of power, taxes, public credit.³

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, Essay IV.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV.

It is refreshing to find sentences like the following: There is sometimes a "kind of opposition between the greatness of the state and the happiness of the individual."¹ "That policy is violent [not natural] that aggrandizes the public by the poverty of the individuals."² Again, Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labor, in a full possession of all the necessities and many of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt that such an equality is suitable to human nature; and diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich than it adds to that of the poor.³ And again,

It is true the English feel some disadvantage of the trade by the high price of labor, which is in part the effect of the riches of their artisans, as well as of the plenty of money. But as foreign trade is not the most material circumstance it is not to be put in competition with the happiness of so many millions.⁴ Once more,

Where the laborers and artisans are accustomed to work for low wages, and to retain but a small part of the fruits of their labor, it is difficult for them even in a free government to better their condition, or conspire among themselves to heighten their wages; but even where they are accustomed to a more plentiful way of life; it is easy for the rich, in an arbitrary government, to conspire against *them*, and throw the whole burden of taxes on their shoulders.⁵

At least with Hume the happiness of one man counted one whether he were rich or poor. He thought a free government was better in part because labor was better paid and more powerful. If only taxes were the only burden that the rich can shift on to the shoulders of the poor the argument of Hume would be complete. In no general way does Hume deal with the problem of distribution. He discusses the subjects named above in their national aspects, but always assumes and often states, as above, that the happiness of the people is paramount.

One interesting thing is stated in the chapter on the "Refinement of the Arts." It is that the development of the mechanical arts prepares the way for the development of the fine arts and that this development evolves new values:

The more these arts advance, the more sociable men become nor is it possible, that, when enriched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be content to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock to the cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge.

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 289.

² *Ibid.*, p. 293.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

. . . . The more men refine, upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind; because nothing is more destructive to true pleasure than such excesses.¹ And if libertine love or even infidelity to the marriage-bed be more frequent in political ages when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenness, on the other hand, is much less common; a vice more odious both to mind and body.²

He further says that the foregoing condition of the fine arts with its accompaniments begets a "humanity" among the people.³

I suppose this humanity is that sympathy that is elsewhere referred to. This is Hume's "theory of a leisure class." The offhanded estimate of the relative demerits of drunkenness and unchastity given above is asserted on the hedonic basis that makes morality identical with aesthetics. While morality has a double basis, that of utility and of a moral sense, yet the test of morality in each case is merely feeling.

COMPARISON OF LOCKE AND HUME

It will perhaps help us to an understanding of how each was affected by his distinct social purpose if we compare the two systems of Locke and Hume.

In the discussion of these two systems we come upon the real beginning and the extreme development of the associational psychology. Locke is handicapped by a scholastic assumption of the idea of existence as adding something to the idea of the object itself. This idea of existence is the power that makes the outer world real.

Again, while Locke assures us that pleasure and pain are attached to virtue and vice, yet morality is demonstrable. Its existence is discoverable by reason. But knowledge according to Locke comes by agreement and disagreement of ideas. The principles of morals, then, must be existent, must have the idea of existence in them. But Hume shows that the idea of its existence adds nothing to the idea of the object. He can then place morality in feeling. But he does not do this completely. He speaks of a "natural" morality. Evidently, then, even with Hume pleasure and pain are to some extent mere marks of the true morality. For this reason Hume must seek to distinguish the pleasure that attends the true morality from that which attends the lower morality, or even vice, in its earlier stages.

In all this lies the reason why Locke did not do as did Hume—make a long analysis of the passions and of the characteristics that are denominated moral in character. That is, morals are demonstrable to Locke;

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

² *Ibid.*, p. 306.

³ *Loc. cit.*

they are felt with Hume. Morality with Locke is conformity to the will of God. Incidentally, it is true that pleasure attaches to goodness and pain to evil. But the feeling feature is not the ground of morality.

But Hume comes close to identifying morals and aesthetics, as shown in the foregoing quotation in which he states that adultery is not so serious an offense as drunkenness. That statement is a direct appeal to feeling as the entire basis of judgment in a question of morality. Modern sociology would seek a basis of judgment in a scientific study of the relative effects as regards certain agreed ends, of adultery and drunkenness. Hume's object is to trace ideals and ideas and impressions. He must do this in the study of mental processes. He can never come out with anything other than a statement of the feelings involved. That is his purpose, the cause alike of his successes, his errors, his limitations. Passing from the association of ideas to revealed religion, he could guess as freely as anyone. He was no longer tied by association of ideas. Locke dared not guess on such a matter. It meant too much. Belief in God was the basis of morality and denial of him was anarchy. With Locke belief in revealed religion was a matter of course.

HUME ON NATURAL RELIGION

In his discussions of miracles, Hume expressed the conviction that his arguments would prove effective in forwarding the cause of the Christian religion. The result had not accorded with that conviction. Are we to conclude that he was essentially insincere or essentially unscientific? Neither, as I believe.

Let us get the argument on miracles clearly in mind. It is merely this: That so wonderful, so unprecedented an event as the raising of one from the dead, or any other allegation of so radical a departure as this from the course of nature, cannot find credence. That is, it cannot do so, by reason, the usual way. There is, in other words, no chance to establish a habit of recurrence such as is necessary to belief. Now, this is pretty fair from Hume's psychology, and in defense of a good man's fame as well as in support of the hypothesis of this paper, I wish here further to elaborate.

How do we get the idea of miracle, is the real question? There is no impression that resembles it. There is no contiguity of ideas and impressions that can give us belief in it. There is no recurrence such as brings conviction in cases of cause and effect. Where, then, shall we go for belief in miracle? Now, I do not say that this is conclusive, but it does seem to me to be Hume's mode of reasoning, i.e., appeal to experi-

ence of the way ideas go together. Why, then, accept the miracles of the Bible? Hume's argument is close to Kant's. It is this: The Christian miracles have been apprehended by the accompanying miracle of faith, which is not of reason, but a phenomenon not subject to his system of psychology. Why, then, add the *Treatise on Natural Religion*? For this reason, to show that his psychology is not final as to truth. No moral, helpful religion can arise out of the principles enunciated in his psychology. Revelation is, then, necessary. God, finding humanity in a bad way, breaks through both the usual order of outward nature and the usual order of psychological processes and puts the belief into the minds of men.¹

To show that this is not special pleading on my part, let us recall that Hume lived all his life a member of the Presbyterian church, that he taught in a divinity school, that he expressed interest in the Christian religion and said that every inquiry into religion was of the utmost importance. Against such a showing can we for a moment consider the possibility that he was insincere? Further, as already noted, the divines took up his argument and used it effectively. In other words, belief in phenomena that lie outside the realm of psychology is not absurd in a skeptic, not unscientific nor proof of insincerity.

It is not wholly out of accord with the words of Hume taken from the fourth book of the *Treatise*:

True scepticism does not consist in perpetually doubting all things, but in limiting our inquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.²

Hume has come out in a very satisfactory place. He is rid of the quarrel between realism and idealism. He has done this by an appeal to the common racial feeling. This opens the way for his moral law based on sympathy—no inconsiderable accomplishment.

He has not withdrawn the world from science. Rather he has tied them together extraordinarily well. He does not expect anyone to refuse to make the inference of cause and effect, though he has shown that it is based on feeling. Habit, racial, common habit, is a good and scientific way to bind the bundles of experience together, and it does not leave us to infer primary qualities in things, nor substance, nor things in themselves in any way, which, since the time of Locke, we are inclined to do.

¹ This is entirely my own interpretation. It would require a Doctor's thesis to prove it.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part IV.

Then, his appeal to the feeling basis has given him a determinism that is very satisfactory to the Calvinists. We are all bound to have certain feelings. Sympathy is a common, unavoidable experience. On that we may rear society.

Then, in both abstract thought and in morals, public agreement may assist the functioning of each. Here habit functions all the way with our philosopher and not merely some of the time as with Locke. In this way feeling may be carried over into political science, and through its ease in carrying on the processes of government, habit may be one of the reasons that render the existing rule legitimate. Thus, our sane and scholarly philosopher, whom men have called skeptic, becomes a very helpful person in his day. Further, he has not failed to do something for the church by separating the question of faith from science and philosophy. All this is no mean achievement, and who shall say that it was not needed in the day when men sought a less repulsive system of morals in order to make place for the pleasures of the mind, the whole *beauty interest*? He has rendered all experiences of pleasure valid, everything that eases the strain, whether in abstract thinking, in human sympathy, or what not. Pleasure becomes regnant, but not bestial pleasure, for Hume has shown men the way to refinements of pleasure—pleasures of the mind in the pursuit of knowledge, the graces of refined association. Every feeling of pleasure is its own excuse and defense. Is not this a satisfying enlargement of Locke's demonstrated moral law? Verily it is.

SUMMARY SHOWING HUME'S PURPOSE THE VARIANT OF HIS THEORY

In getting rid of the dualism between idealism and realism he has stressed every category of feeling to its utmost limits. He even makes thought equivalent to habit based on feeling. He has pulled the group agreement over from its place to effect conviction in even the abstruse sciences, as if it were something like the effect of recurrence in cause and effect. To this we do not object, except that it should have suggested a functional, social definition of knowledge. It cannot come in under association of ideas.

In finding a place for his determinism in morals, he has made a very unsuccessful endeavor to isolate sympathy from all other feelings due to interest. He has thus made a "psychic plane" of a sort, but the sympathy is spread too thin to make it a very satisfactory basis of morals.

He has come out with his problem solved. He has established the legitimacy of the new values that society was working upon.

CHAPTER V

JOHN STUART MILL

John Stuart Mill was born 1806, died 1873. His deep and lasting admiration for his father appears in his autobiography. The "brave old wisdom of sincerity" in James Mill never lost its power over and its influence in the life of his greater son. The father's stern sense of duty conflicts in spirit with the hedonic theory of both. In 1820, John Stuart Mill went to France and was for a time under the influence of Sir Samuel Bentham, brother of the philosopher. These two were the chief molding forces in the early life of our author. The father and the son were both recalcitrants from the theology of their day. The latter seems to have acquiesced in the feeling of his father that the Manichean theory of good and evil was the apparently best theory. But both seem to have been agnostic on this point and to have concluded that as to the origin of things nothing can be known. Says the son: "I am thus one of the very few examples, in this country, of one who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it; I grew up in a negative state with regard to it."¹ Mill expresses the conviction concerning himself that his own mind was "equally ready to learn and to unlearn either from its own thoughts or from those of others." Passing over the period of "youthful propagandism," as Mill calls it, we come to that interesting time that he speaks of as "a crisis in my mental history." He says:

From the winter of 1821, when I first read Bentham . . . , I had what might truly be called an object in life: to be a reformer of the world. My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object.

In the autumn of 1826, he fell into a "dull state of nerves" and from then into a prolonged melancholy. He framed to himself this question:

Suppose that all your objects in life were realised; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to could be completely effected at this very instant; would this be a great joy and happiness to you?

To this question he was obliged to answer "No." During this long period of melancholy, lasting about a year, he came to hold some such view of life as the antiself-consciousness theory of Carlyle. While holding that

¹ *Autobiography*, p. 43.

happiness is the test of all rules of conduct and the end of life, he concluded:

. . . who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art of pursuit, followed, not as a means, but as itself an ideal end.¹

Here Mill has confused his hedonism with something else—the game. The first part of the statement only is hedonic. Had Mill dropped the first and second phases of the foregoing statement and confined himself to the last, the concrete question of objective ends, he would have come near to the point of view of Dr. Small in his course on social ethics. He might even have seen, too, that happiness is the tone, the accompaniment of the satisfactory activity, the one that “works,” to employ the word used by Dr. Small in the same course. The same general point of view that Dr. Small holds is found in Dewey and Tufts’s *Ethics*,² in which Mill’s mistake as to the part of feeling in the social process and in the life of the individual organism is set forth. Out of his slough of despond Mill came at last with a conviction that the finer feelings have a part in life. He read Wordsworth and Byron and Carlyle and received much emotional benefit, as he thought. Then came what Mill calls one onward stage of his mental development. It came with Macaulay’s attack on his father’s *Essay on Government*. Here we meet the dualism between experience and science divided between two men—James Mill standing for the science side, Macaulay for the experience. John Stuart Mill came to believe that there were errors in his father’s system.

Identity of interest between the governing body and the community at large [a doctrine to which James Mill adhered, says the son, after Macaulay’s attack] is not, in any practical sense which can be attached to it, the only thing on which good government depends; neither can this identity of interest be secured by the mere conditions of election.³

Out of this struggle grew the system of logic which is Mill’s great contribution to human thought. Mill noted that the men of his day in violent reaction from the thinking of the eighteenth century were over-emphasizing half-truths in contradiction to the half-truths that the previous century had held sacred. “Goethe’s device, ‘many-sidedness,’ was one which I would most willingly, at this period, have taken for

¹ These facts are taken from Mill’s *Autobiography*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1874. Also see the article on Mill in the *Americana, Scientific American*, 1902.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 289. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1910.

³ *Autobiography*, p. 158.

mine." At this time he drew the distinction that meant so much to his later work between fatalism and circumstances. This, with the belief that every choice made by man goes into the process as a factor in the after-result, gives the basis for all his later work. Now, this is all important. When Mill writes his political economy, for instance, he does not postulate a science that is thought of as forever fixed. He distinctly says the contrary. In his chapter on "The Logic of the Social Sciences" he distinctly states that he postulates political economy on a state of affairs that obtained in its fulness only in Great Britain and the United States, and that even in some of the states of Europe those conditions did not prevail, much less in the Orient. I believe that Mill's chief error was a failure to note the rapidity of the process of change and an overemphasis of uniformity, as I shall show later in this paper, but he did not consciously postulate any entities, and only by implication and with frequent correction did he state his principles of human nature as if there were no chance for change. It is true, however, that he frequently uses language that implies a static conception of society as being possibly realizable. Such expressions as "the ideally best government"¹ reveal this. His objection to socialism is that mankind is not ready for it, except certain classes who might establish a co-operative commonwealth if placed by themselves. But one might mention the other horn of the dilemma, that when men get good enough for that they do not need socialism in order to make them co-operate.

As for the rest, Mill lived in an age of turmoil as to the labor conditions. He saw the Chartist movement and felt the thrill of Carlyle's protest in *Past and Present*. He came to believe in the religion of humanity, a sort of "Choir Invisible" motive for sacrifice, as did August Comte and George Eliot. Under the influence of Mrs. Taylor he became deeply emotional in his attitude toward human life, and indeed all life. Though he lived some years after the date of the publication of *The Origin of the Species* and had some debate with Herbert Spencer, he never felt the implications of the theory of evolution for sociology.

THE WORKS OF MILL

It was characteristic of Mill that when he perceived that the associational psychology of his father and the laissez faire to which he early committed himself broke down he frankly acknowledged that his

¹ *Representative Government*, chap. iii (title). London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.

system was not really a system¹ but a choice of the strong points of opposing systems. In his *System of Logic*² he insists that experience is the sufficient explanation of the origin of all our ideas, even those of algebra and arithmetic. We have learned by experience to call the sum of 3 and 4, 7, and the mere fact that it is impossible for us to think of their making 8 has nothing of value in it as proving any eternal truth in the matter. Law, then, with Mill is simply the order in which things present themselves to the mind. On the other hand, every act of choice reacts on the person who chooses and thus must be reckoned with in all following choices. Thus, to Mill necessity meant merely predictability and freedom meant that choice is a cause as well as an effect. To Mill this was supremely important, as character was the important thing in his reckoning. Still, Mill lingered among fixed entities such as principles of nature, as is indeed the case with all pre-evolutionary writers. Mill could not reconcile any idea of God's character with the existence of evil unless God were not omnipotent. Holding to the benevolence of Deity, he concluded that there was other power, an evil power, over which God had not complete control³. The world, then, was a battleground in which there was no certainty of victory for good. The suffering in the human race must be overcome only by sacrifice. His pressing need, then, is for a man who will make the necessary sacrifice for the good of mankind. Believing that man must pursue happiness, he here invents the category of qualities of happiness.⁴ This means that the consciousness of having chosen for others' good becomes part of the happiness. While on the whole clinging to Bentham's greatest good to the greatest number, he felt that one cannot work directly toward that end but must choose concrete ends that have the larger aim in view. This involved frequent readjustment as new "principles of nature" were brought to light in the course of experience. Induction followed by deduction, the result subject to further induction and further deduction—such was the system. It was also composition of causes, not addition, as had been the case with his predecessors.

Mill's category of qualities of happiness, as indicated, was invented to help him to a person who would sacrifice for his fellow-man. His reward was to be quality in his happiness. Mill is here in the same trouble in which we found Hume. There is no guaranty that anyone will

¹ This throws away the "inability to conceive the opposite" of Hume.

² *Op. cit.*, New York: Harper Bros., 1860.

³ *Autobiography*.

⁴ "Utilitarianism," *Autobiography*.

choose one quality of happiness over another. He must, then, beg the question.¹

The criticism showered on Mill merely calls forth the reiterated statement that it is possible for men to choose this higher quality of happiness. The thing needed here to bridge the chasm between the pleasure-pain psychology and the social individual needed for the sociology of Mill (and likewise for Hobbes and Locke and Hume) is knowledge of the self. This, however, was not possible to pre-evolutionary thinkers. Such men as Baldwin,² Mead,³ and Vincent⁴ have done much to bridge the chasm; likewise Tarde.⁵

In his *System of Logic*, Mill finds that there are certain broad traits of human nature that render possible a science of political economy. These fundamental traits are aversion to labor and desire for gain.

¹ Feeling that such deadlocks between the ideals of the individual and the good of the group as conceived by the group are the crux of the moral situation, Professor L. L. Bernard, of the University of Minnesota, has made a vigorous attempt to solve the difficulty. He endeavors to get a snapshot of the moral situation at that point, and as it is a snapshot he can conceive it as static. In the solution he places morality entirely with the group. The group may then rightly deal with the individual as it may please. In so doing there may be loss to the group and destruction to the individual. But the author does not, of course, conceive that the process is to cease there. The future may vindicate the individual in his judgment as to what may even at the moment have been the good of the group. For that reason I cannot quite agree with Professor Hayes, who in a review of the book, *American Journal of Sociology*, says: "Then no prophets should invite stones, nor Christ dare the cross." This statement would be justified if Professor Bernard conceived that his snapshot was to be the everlasting standard of morals. But he does not. He says that the loss to society is to be reduced to a minimum as soon as possible by the introduction of scientific understanding of the good of the group and presumably a reduction of the unscientific attitude of society that refuses to consider carefully the ideas of reformers before inflicting the martyrdom of disapproval, ostracism, or death. Indeed, I think we must credit the author with some of the spirit of such martyrs as evidenced by the sweeping attack on the "subjectivistic hedonism" which he ascribes to most of the writers of his day. Nobody gets on without a place for the martyr, not even Hobbes, who distinctly says that a Christian had better sacrifice his life than refuse his belief in Christ at the behest of an un-Christian monarch.

Luther Lee Bernard, *The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Review by Edward C. Hayes, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVII, No. 6.

² *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (4th ed.). New York: Macmillan Co., 1906.

³ *Lectures on Social Self* (unpublished).

⁴ The Rivalry of Social Groups (referred to above).

⁵ *L'Opinion à la Foule*.

Being under the necessity of seeking pleasure and all labor being pain, one can only choose to labor because of some reward that lies outside the labor. He cannot find his joy there. Perhaps Mill would have said that, as a matter of fact, men do not find pleasure in labor but that it is useless to speculate as to the possibility of their finding it there. Here we find the seeds of Mill's modified socialism. If labor means only pain, then industry cannot mean pleasure. It is, then, a destroyer whose power must be hampered in every way possible. But Mill believes that only a very limited number of choice souls were in his day fit for socialism. Under the existing conditions he felt that men were unfitted for the co-operative state. But, manifestly, socialism was the logical outcome of pleasure-pain psychology. Laissez faire economics brings socialism surely in its trail.

In his discussion of socialism Mill's pleasure-pain psychology led him into errors: (1) As pleasure cannot be associated with labor, or at least is not, he concludes that the laborer cannot be efficient under any system of co-operation except by reason of some adventitious circumstances that have made him a man of a certain type of character. For the correction of this error he needs the category of partnership, as used by Dr. Small, something to identify a part of the reward, that is, the development of the personality, with the labor itself. This is not inseparable from private ownership. (2) Mill did not reckon with the power of habit in making work not disagreeable and even agreeable. Workers for prison reform are now making use of the conception to prepare prisoners for life after leaving prison. (3) Mill underestimates the charm of the game.¹ The captain of industry today gets out of business the gratification of his sporting instinct. (4) He underestimates the influence of the group opinion. He does speak of this but conceives it of slight value. This, then, confirms him in the contention that the development of altruism alone is the hope of society.

FUNDAMENTAL DIGNITY OF MAN

This seems to be the last refuge of the entity of equality of men. In *Principles of Political Economy*, in a chapter on "The Limits of Laissez Faire" (a character that Professor Laughlin has omitted in his *Mill*), Mill says:

It is evident even at first sight that the authoritative form of government intervention has a more limited sphere of operation than the other. It requires a much stronger necessity to justify it in any case while there are large depart-

¹ William Isaac Thomas, "The Gaming Instinct," *American Journal of Sociology*, VI, 161.

ments of human life from which it must be unreservedly and imperiously excluded. Whatever theory we adopt respecting the foundation of social union, and under whatever political institutions we live, there is a circle around every individual human being, which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted to overstep; there is a part of the life of the person who has come to years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person *ought to reign*¹ uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively. That there is, or ought to be, some space in human existence thus entrenched round and sacred from authoritative intrusion, no one who professes the smallest regard to human freedom and dignity will call in question: the point to be determined is where the limit should be placed; how large a province of human life this reserved territory should include. I apprehend that it ought to include all that part that concerns only the life, whether inward or outward, of the individual, and does not affect the interests of others, or affects them through the moral influence of example. With respect to the domain of the inward consciousness, the thoughts and feelings, and as much of external conduct as is personal only, involving no consequences, none at least of a painful or injurious kind to other people, I hold that it is allowable in all, and in the more thoughtful and cultivated often a duty, to assert and promulgate, with all the force they are capable of, their opinion of what is good and bad, admirable or contemptible, but not to compel others to conform to their opinion of what is right, whether the force used is that of extra-legal coercion or exerts itself by means of law. Even in those portions of conduct which do affect the interests of others, the onus of making out a case always lies on the defender of legal prohibitions.²

Now, with all due reverence, I submit the question, Would John Stuart Mill have written such a paragraph as the foregoing had he not been seeking a compromise between the old individualism and his recognition of the needs of society, to the point of blindness? How can there be duty in cases of conduct that is non-social? Morality about conduct which is non-moral? What shall we say about "there is or ought to be"? Which is it—fact or obligation? What is the line between extra-legal coercion and persuasion? Why except the acts that affect only "through the moral influence of example"? Is there some conduct that is more social than example? Why is Mill anxious to protect the "domain of the inward consciousness" from outward and legal control? Can it be done? It *is* protected as long as it remains "inward." And how does Mill expect to protect the thoughts and feelings from extra-legal control, seeing they are made chiefly by that means?

¹ Italics mine.

² *Principles of Political Economy*, p. 206. George Routledge & Sons, 1895.

But when in another place Mill asserts that a policy of toleration has proved useful to mankind he is at least intelligible.

Mill needs this category of dignity of human nature. It is the basis of his morals, for there must be a man able to choose the higher good and there must be one upon whom he may expend his altruism. Dignity furnishes both.

However, in discussing his plan of multiple voting, this original dignity counts for only one vote and not even for that in case a man is illiterate, while character and intelligence count for multiples of "dignity." Considerations of social need work at both ends of the plan, while dignity holds the middle.

MILL'S PURPOSE THE VARIANT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY

Mill's ends of being: happiness.—Expressed in the terms of "greatest good to greatest number," we offer the following. This statement compels Mill to include all human, even all sentient, beings. Against the happiness of Abraham Lincoln must be placed that of the Zulu savage, and some sort of estimate must be made. The happiness of the savage must count 1 and that of Lincoln some other number. All this has been gone over many times. I am merely showing here that the "original dignity" of human beings and even the original something in animals must be considered. The greatest good must be brought in in order to make a place for altruism. It is almost amusing that Mill attacked sentimental considerations as the prevailing philosophy of his day and then based his whole philosophy on emotion. But, how otherwise could Mill include the laborer in whom he was interested in his treatment?

Again, Mill thought of public opinion mainly as a force for the suppression of the individual and for the establishment of the tyrannies of majorities. But he calls on the tyranny of the majority to protect the individual in his exercise of freedom. Why should the freedom of the individual be protected if the greatest good to the greatest number is to be held the end of being? That greatest good is a subjective state, a condition of consciousness. Why may not the bigoted group get more happiness in burning a recalcitrant or using the "extra-legal control" of social ostracism than would come in any other way? If the original dignity of human nature were the only reason for toleration, this might easily be true. But Mill, incidentally, so far as his system is concerned, hits upon another reason for toleration. He claims that experience shows

that such toleration ultimately results in greater happiness. "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to society."¹

Mill would confine all "extra-legal compulsion" to persuasion.² He speaks of the right to freedom of thought. But who thinks in a vacuum? Persuasion is but the smallest part of the power that is exercised over the individual by the group. The right of free thought without the right of expression is a mere ghost of a right. The moment expression begins, then the group will express approval or disapproval to such extent as the group desires, and that group must insist on its own judgment, no matter how mistaken that judgment may be, or cease to be the same group. If, then, conflict between the group and the individual become irreconcilable, we may have a case of a common criminal or a man like John Brown, or of a martyr, like Socrates or Jesus, but there is no eternal entity by which ultimate judgment of the case can be rendered. Mill's assertion that toleration works for the good of mankind must, then, be modified by inserting the word "sometimes." Why could not Mill have found in his Malthusianism a reason for the elimination of the unfit? Because of "original dignity." As to the practical value of the suggestion that toleration begets the good of society by the development of experts, that is certainly true if it be not done at too great loss in other directions.

Again, if Mill had had no laissez faire theory to defend, could he not have found in extra-legal compulsion a means for organized groups to propagate ideas of social good? To Mill it is absolutely necessary for men to adopt the higher good and yet if they do not the rightful method of correcting the evil situation is by persuasion and by that alone. It is pertinent to ask how any control over actions not criminal is to be established under Mill's system. Apparently men are to stumble along until by accident, by a system of trial and error they come upon the fact that the life is more than meat and the body than raiment, and decide to choose the higher good. But we know that Mill did not see much of the processes going on in society anyway. Fear of the vast and irresistible power of government made him fearful of all forms of control. Mill saw but one group, the state, and when he comes upon extra-legal control he has no knowledge of other groups. Yet it is only in the light of "extra-legal" groups that these phenomena can be understood. Modern society secures in a measure that which Mill desired by reason of

¹ *Essay on Liberty.*

² *Ibid.*

its multiplicity of groupings of mankind. Every modern man belongs to many groups, as shown by Professor Vincent.¹ The principles involved in passing out of one group and into another, where it is a question of conscience, is shown by Professor Royce in his *Philosophy of Loyalty*.² Opposing groups beget not toleration but protection for the individual as against other groups.

With Mill liberty means absence of barriers. Liberty ought to mean progress by control. The struggle between the individual and the group that resulted in separation in any way would be the failure of one or the other to experience in the desired degree progress and control at the same moment.

This misconception of liberty is a part of his system due to the extreme eagerness to establish toleration. Now, had Mill divided his discussion of toleration into two parts, its utility value and its "original dignity" aspect, he might have decided to throw away the latter and modify the former, by concluding that toleration is sometimes productive of good to society and sometimes not.

It seems almost unfair to try to hold Mill to a system, seeing he frankly stated that he had no system. And, indeed, no one can carp at his results, but his method of procedure did call for frequent begging of the question and, indeed, I think perhaps he would admit as much. Holding as he did that experience has yet much to reveal, he merely generalized his observations and proceeded accordingly, admitting all the while that any new discovery might prove his "fundamental principles" not fundamental. But the trouble has been that his followers have not hesitated to take his generalizations as eternal verity. Not long since a teacher in a great university said in my presence that the remedy for the ills of our economic system was to "develop altruism."³ Mill's remedy exactly. The same teacher recommended to his class the abstraction from two given situations all that was not common to both "in order to find the principle involved." Mill's method without the constructive features thereof.

¹ *Op. cit.*

² Josiah Royce, *op. cit.*, Macmillan, 1910.

³ Mill, "Interest," *Principles of Political Economy*.

CHAPTER VI

CHANGES IN METHOD

This chapter and the following one are intended to set into clear relief the fact that the shift of view as we look at one author after another is due to the fact set forth in the first chapter of this paper, namely, that each postulates society as static, metaphysically already existent in the ideal state that the author has in view. No one of these writers could by any possibility think of change as the really permanent and the only permanent aspect of the world and of society. He merely hoped to move society from the evil place in which he found it to the one and only good place actually existent which he conceived.

Now, to accomplish this he needed a method as sure, as fixed, and as static as his fixed metaphysical world. So each tried mathematics. With Hobbes this is perfectly evident, with the rest concealed, but nevertheless in each case the process is addition and subtraction. In the long two centuries there has been little change in this respect. The reason lies in the limitations of any non-evolutionary view of the universe. In the last analysis such view *must* consist of addition and subtraction. From a given situation must be subtracted anything that would interfere with the working of the entity involved. Truth is ever concealed by the things that accompany. Having subtracted for the essence and having found it, we may now add and so build up the real world, which exists in the mind of God or somewhere else but to our view is veiled and indistinct.

The method of mathematics is just this; it appears first in the nominalism of Hobbes. It is there more consistently than it would be in any of his successors except Mill. It would not be inconsistent in Mill, because he knows that he has no system and frankly admits it. But Mill had no nomination. With Hobbes the fascination is irresistible. He would have order at all cost. "You can't add anything else," he says, "add names." Geometry was his supreme reliance. He visualized the universe in geometrical figures that consisted of added lines.

Locke's method is not so different as he imagined. He, too, is adding and subtracting, but it is the real not the nominal essence that he would lay bare to the gaze. But what is the real essence? Just *being* and no more. Hume attacked Locke there and said that substance was made of qualities. Pushing farther, he decided that geometry will not do as a

method, because there are not straight lines, etc., absolutely,¹ but he thought that the numbers used in arithmetic and algebra, being highly abstract, were better. That is a partial return to the nominalism of Hobbes, and for a reason. As Hobbes wanted an orderly outward world, so Hume wanted an orderly subjective world of association of ideas. With him an idea was valid if one could not conceive the opposite. Now that would fit with numbers. That is as far as experience could go. Mill in reply to those who held to intuitive knowledge maintained that all ideas are the product of experience, even those of arithmetic.² He did not accept Hume's test of the validity of an idea, that of the impossibility of conceiving the contrary, though we must not infer that Hume held even intuitive knowledge as having an ultimate validity beyond experience. Mill seems to hold that one might by a different experience come to believe that 3 and 4 equal 9. His argument is that we are sure that our experience is sufficient to make us believe that 3 and 4 are 7; then why call for anything further? The mere fact that we cannot conceive the contrary counts for nothing.

EXPERIENCE AND SCIENCE

Following close upon the battle over nominalism and mathematics is that of the foregoing dualism. How can we be certain? Hobbes is sure that we cannot be sure without science and that science is something other than experience.

This dualism becomes less pronounced as soon as essences are displaced. But Hume leaves us without the faintest guaranty that there is going to be any continuity of experience, and hence science will be valid only so long as the order of nature does not break up in some way not known but possibly impending at any moment. Still Hume's discussion of cause and effect gives us the definition of science that is free from metaphysics. It is the order in which phenomena appear in the mind. Mill did not add anything to this definition but he did feel that human experience would reveal new principles of nature that would call for new generalizations. Hence he urged induction and deduction followed by further induction and deduction, *ad infinitum*.

The earlier part of this history which we are studying concerns in a large measure the dispute as to *what* is added and subtracted in making science. When the dualism between experience and science disappears, then science begins to be constructed out of generalized experiences by

¹ Hume, *Works*, I, 78.

² *A System of Logic*, p. 165. New York: Harper & Bros., 1860.

the same process of eliminating some aspects of the situation in order to reveal the others in isolation from the entire process that is used in eliminating the qualities to find substance. Thus the expression "other things being equal" or some equivalent therefor appears. Hume uses it in his discussion of why utility pleases, and Mill repeats it again and again in defense of his science of political economy. That is, having admitted that science is inseparable from experience, detached portions of experience must be taken, isolated from the entire experience and generalized as entities as certainly as substances ever were.

Mill was not unaware that there are dangers in this method. He says in his logic that the addition of causes may not always give a simple result. Composition of causes is the chief method indorsed by him.¹ Frequent correction is needed, according to this author. But his followers have heeded little the warnings of their master, as shown in the notable omission in the book of Professor Laughlin, as already stated. It is this tendency in scientific thought as in the conduct of business to isolate the science and the thing from all human processes that calls for such work as is done by Professor Small in his book, *The Meaning of Social Science*.² The statement made at the beginning of this chapter that method has not so greatly changed is illustrated especially well by this last condition. As Hume said to Locke, "You have made substance out of the qualities," so Small says to others, especially the extreme laissez faire economists, "You have made your entities, fundamental principles or whatever they are called, out of a number of things that change, often over night."

In conclusion of this chapter let it be said that the method of abstracting from some entity results necessarily in begging the question of the existence of the entity itself. The existence of rights, principles of government, etc., is just as little capable of demonstration as that of substance. Locke is indeed forced at last to say that he cannot find substance, he merely believes that it is. An endeavor to demonstrate the existence of such entity as toleration will eventuate in the same futile assertion, or rather would do so were the philosopher to keep to his line of argument instead of turning to another matter—the utility of toleration—as they all do before they get through with the treatment of any substance, essence, principle, or what not. The advantage that such entity as toleration has in the struggle for existence over that of substance is just this utility proof, while substance can go out whenever men change

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

² University of Chicago Press, 1910.

their system of logic, or discard logic altogether, which condition may arise at any time.

However, no entity has been without its use. The category of substance stood for the objectivity of the world and preserved the idea of law in philosophy, and when Hume rejected it he nearly destroyed the conception of law, and the order of experience became caprice. Mill with his phenomenism had to put the matter of law back into place. Yes, entities have had value. Like the atomic theory, they have furnished a hypothesis that helped in solving a problem.

Hence I repeat the statement with which I began, method has not greatly changed up to the time of the evolutionary thinkers, in the realm of sociology, particularly Small. But each man sought to change his method to some extent and always in accord with his purpose.

In the search for order, Hobbes finds his nominalism the simplest thing to add. In a deeper moral struggle for harmony between man and nature and God, Locke sought the real essence. His problem made him a pluralist, and so he has the metaphysic that calls for parallelism between the material world and the world of thought.

Hume's skepticism is the result of his problem; and his method, too, of recognizing that the things added are abstractions made by the mind, not existing apart from qualities, is the logical outcome of his endeavor to rear a world out of the comparison of ideas alone, when he saw that the ideas did not exist in the things. The recognition of this made him place morality on the basis of feeling and that developed into the demand for degrees of pleasure.

With Mill we have frank recognition that we deliberately make up the thing with which we build theories. He does not care. He is a phenomenist. The phenomena are enough. He will not attempt to go behind them. All he needs for his conclusions is law, meaning order of phenomena and free will, which means that choice goes into the process.

CHAPTER VII

MODIFICATION OF CATEGORIES

I purpose now to show more clearly than was possible in the consideration of these writers one at a time that their purposes have been the variant of their theories by showing the reason for the divergence among them produced by differences in purpose.

First, let us consider the character of God. Hobbes founds his state on the right implied in "irresistible power," which is all the right there is. This is God's right, that of irresistible power. God is not good. His goodness is merely his goodness to us, an arbitrary thing. God has no character.

Locke did not say the same thing. He dodged the effect of his own logic. He founds morality on the will of God. He says: "The rule prescribed by God is the true and only measure of morality." Again, "God has by an inseparable connection joined virtue and public happiness together."¹ This view ascribes no moral character to God. Goodness is conformity to God's will. God's goodness is conformity to God's will. That goodness and happiness are joined in human experience is an arbitrary arrangement. But this definition of goodness is absolutely needed by Locke to make good his argument against toleration toward atheists. They were the only necessarily antisocial beings.

An extension of the associational psychology enabled Hume to place the idea of God yet farther in the background. In the *Treatise*² he discusses the idea of God as cause as follows:

There seems only this dilemma left us in the present case: either to assert that nothing can be the cause of another but where the mind can see the connection in its idea of the objects; or to maintain all objects that we find constantly conjoined are upon that account to be regarded as causes and effects. If we choose the first part of the dilemma, these are the consequences. First, we in reality affirm that there is no such thing in the universe as a cause or productive principle, not even the Deity himself; since our idea of that supreme being is derived from particular impressions none of which contain any efficacy nor seem to have any connection with any other existence. As to what may be said, that the connection betwixt the idea of an infinitely powerful being and that of any effect which he wills is necessary and unavoidable; I answer, that we

¹ *Works*, I, 72.

² *Op. cit.*, I, 212.

have no idea of any being endowed with any power, much less of one endowed with infinite power. But if we will exchange expressions, we can only define power by connection; and then in saying that the idea of an infinitely powerful being is connected with that of every effect that he wills we really do no more than assert that a being whose volition is connected with every effect is connected with every effect; which is an identical proposition, and gives no insight into the nature of this power or connection. But, secondly, supposing that the Deity were the great and efficacious principle which supplies the deficiency of all causes, this leads us into the grossest impieties and absurdities. For upon the same account that we have recourse to him in natural operations, and assert that matter cannot of itself communicate motion, or produce thought, viz., because there is no apparent connection between these objects, I say, upon the very same account, we must acknowledge that the Deity is the author of our volitions and perceptions, since they have no apparent connection either with one another or with the supposed but unknown substance of the soul. This agency of the Supreme Being we know to have been asserted by several philosophers with relation to all the actions of the mind, except volition, or rather an inconsiderable part of volition; though 'tis easy to perceive that this exception is a mere pretext to avoid the dangerous consequences of that doctrine. If nothing be active but what has apparent power, thought is in no case any more active than matter; and if this inactivity must make us have recourse to a Deity, the supreme being is the real cause of all our actions, bad as well as good, vicious as well as virtuous.

I suppose that it is discussions like this that have raised the question of the sincerity of Hume in his discussions of the Christian religion. But note again the purpose of the foregoing. This is a psychological discussion and is concerned with the processes by which we assert cause and effect relations. It does not in any place assert or imply that Hume did not believe that there is a God. He merely cannot find him in his analysis of cause and effect relations. God is not revealed to reason—that is the conclusion here. In another realm, that of faith, belief arises in God, miracles, etc., by another process over which association of ideas has no effect.

Mill got rid of this whole difficulty by saying that if there be a God he is not all powerful.¹ He confesses to a leaning to a doctrine of good and evil as existing as independent entities in the universe. This position is profoundly consistent with Mill's design of making volition in man the chief power of solving the difficulties of life.

Until the doctrine of evolution was applied to the question of evil no other means was possible whereby the responsibility for its existence could be taken from God and placed even in part upon man. In Mill

¹ *Autobiography*.

we pass from the effort to solve human troubles by implying that we are in opposition to Deity to the position that man may be a co-operating member in the enterprise.

From the foregoing we pass by an easy transition to the idea of

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL

With Hobbes, as with all the logical Calvinists, God permits evil because he wants to. But there would seem to be two sorts of evil: one being due to the mistakes of man arising from his not knowing the *leges naturales* which are God's laws for the government of man; and then there is the evil that arises from an evil personality or personalities that manifests itself in witchcraft, mob spirit being one manifestation. The first evil may be overcome by education, including education of the King; the second will not disappear until the coming of Christ.

With Locke evil is mistake alone. With Hume evil seems to be even less a force than with Locke. Law outside laws of association of ideas has practically disappeared with Hume, and evil with it. Mill turns back to Hobbes, at least so far as to recognize evil as a force or personality—an active principle.

NATURAL LAW

The fundamental natural law with Hobbes is the right that attaches to power. It is without any mitigating or softening characteristics, and man's chief business as a social being is to put the *jus naturale* out and to put the mild *leges naturales* in place thereof.

Locke is the one who conceives of nature and natural laws as harmonious with man's well-being. Is there natural law in Hume? If so, it exists in the philosophical relations of ideas. In Mill the whole idea of law in any realm is predictability, the way in which phenomena present themselves to the mind.

FOUR STAGES OF HEDONISM

In Hobbes man must take the line of least resistance to the pleasure which is the end of being. No word is said of balancing one pleasure against another. While Hobbes has a means-end category, it must not be confused with any idea of choosing one pleasure against another. With Hobbes man can only take a long look ahead in adjusting means to ends, not in choice of pleasures. This is the first stage of hedonism.¹

Locke, in discussing the will makes provision for a choice between contending pleasures by which man chooses the pleasure that will be a

¹ *Works*, II, 5.

more permanent factor in his life. He may thus defer the pleasure or even do the disagreeable thing in order to establish a habit that will contribute to his later enjoyment. But even here man must will. He cannot refuse to choose, for that is choice.¹

In Hume there are grades of happiness. In his *Essay on Delicacy of Taste* he says:

But perhaps I have gone too far in saying that a cultivated taste for polite arts extinguishes the passions and renders us indifferent to those objects which are so fondly pursued by the rest of mankind. On further reflection I find it rather improves our sensibility for all the tender and agreeable passions; at the same time that it renders the mind incapable of the rougher and more boisterous emotions.²

The extreme development of the pleasure-pain psychology here shown stops short and must stop short of any deep moral conviction. But has Hume made a case for grades of happiness? Is one grade to be preferred to another? He merely begs the question. Culture has its pleasures. So do other kinds of life have theirs—that is the entire argument. I suppose that Hume conceived this discussion of delicacy of taste as a fitting prelude to the discussion of *Why Utility Pleases*. But there is no logical connection. Utility pleases anybody, provided his interests be not entered on the other side, but presumably persons of delicate taste would be more easily moved by utility, detached from their own interests, so Hume conceives. Mill introduces the fourth stage of hedonism, which is not for a moment to be confused with the foregoing, as Mill has himself warned us.

This distinction is that of qualities of happiness and is due to the fact that choice made goes into the process and becomes part of the resultant joy. The consciousness of having chosen nobly is its own reward.³ But, as before stated, Mill here begs the question. A distinction of this sort under the associational psychology is impossible. Happiness is happiness. That is all. I feel rather sure that even present-day psychology has not cleared up this point wholly. It has merely shifted the view. The activity is good or bad in its whole effect, not merely in the emotional quality involved.

THE CONTRACT

This category in Hobbes has been already elaborately discussed, as also has been Locke's amendment thereto. Hume criticized the idea of

¹ *Works*, Book II, chap. xxi, sec 21.

² *Op. cit.*, III, 6.

³ *Utilitarianism*, p. 20. Chicago, Ill.: Belford, Clarke & Co., 1888.

Hobbes, saying that the idea of contract must be largely modified. In *Essays Moral and Political*, Volume I, Hume discusses, Essay 5, "Of the Origin of Government," and in Essay 12, "Of the Original Contract." In the former he says: "Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit." However, he says that society did not arise because of full consciousness of the needs of the case. "Government commences more casually than this." A suggestion of the psychology of leadership occurs in the following:

It is probable that the first ascendancy of one man over multitudes began during a state of war, where the superiority of courage and genius discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert are most requisite, and where the pernicious effects of disorder are most sensibly felt.

The long continuance of this state begets the habit of submission, and the benefits of wise leadership appear. Some, he says, have an immediate and visible interest in maintaining the government, and "habit soon consolidates what other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded." In the *Essay on the Original Contract* he answers Hobbes's argument on the eternal obligation of keeping promises as the sole justification of government by saying that allegiance and fidelity stand on the same footing, that of "the apparent interests and necessities of society."

I say you find yourself embarrassed when it is asked why we are bound to keep our word. Nor can you give any answer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

Habit plays a great rôle here. The presumption is against those who would disturb the established government, because habit has arisen to cement interests and in so doing has become a part of the satisfaction of the subject with the existing order—in other words, habit is a constituent part of utility in this case.

With Mill there is no discussion of the contractual conception of government.

EPISTEMOLOGY

In regard to epistemology there is a wide difference among our authors. With Hobbes the universe is material, and knowledge of it as existing is assumed.

With Locke the ground is broken for the general skepticism of Hume. There is wavering as to the complex idea of substance. He believes but cannot affirm. When Hume destroys the idea of substance

and shows that the whole of it may be merely the product of the mind, made up by addition of qualities, he has destroyed the certainty of our mental processes so far as giving us any ground of ultimate truth beyond experience. Intuition and demonstration are, then, alike uncertain. You may examine them introspectively, but cannot affirm that they give an ultimate reality. Now, Mill's phenomenalism is the next step. What had Hume left with which to go on? First, the order of ideas as shown extremely in cause and effect. This is important for Mill. As Mill is primarily a sociologist, the second thing that Hume had done for him and those like him was the production of the category of sympathy, linked with degrees of happiness.

But further than that, Hume had relieved Mill and all his successors of a large burden of mystic entities. Existence, substance, degrees of certainty, etc., are gone. Mill has left, then, appearances, phenomena, behind which it is needless for him to go. These phenomena would be predictable if we knew their antecedents. Let us find out all we can. One important phenomenon is the action of the will. It is a factor, invariably present, in social phenomena. We thus have the two aspects of Mill's system: law, in the sense of predictability of human action, all the conditions being known, and the free will entering into the process for better or worse.

IN A GENERAL SENSE THE CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALISM
ARE NEGATIVE

This statement is antecedently probable of any theory based on an associational psychology. Ideas must go together in some fixed way and not in a way to forward a process, solve a new problem.

Equality is a category used to set the individual off in some way. Natural law is used to tie these individuals together. Their association makes no organic change. Justice is something that men must fit into. It has no spirit by which it can forward the life of the people by a "new nationalism." It merely was and is and is to be. Hobbes realizes this inert characteristic in some degree, and so he embodies justice in the will of the governing body representing the will of the people. This did not provide for a growing justice, but it did render possible quick changes of policy.

With words like "utility," "sympathy," etc., our authors attempt to throw away their individualism, and in that way we get categories that are not wholly inert. But they do not go the entire length. Thus utility in Hume is the entire justification of one portion of his morals,

those that are the result of artifice, as justice, while in the natural virtues utility is a *mark* only.

Mill tries to split the idea of equality and retain the inert part of it in his category of "original dignity" of human nature. This original dignity must not be infringed, but it is sufficiently recognized if a man have one vote in a system of multiple voting, and may even be disregarded in view of the necessity of intelligence in voting. Hobbes, as before stated, finds the Golden Rule in negative form in his summary of his *leges naturales*.

Because of this negative nature of their categories, these writers are obliged to smuggle in others to assist the original categories, which alone are true members of the system, in order that they may function at all. Thus Locke and Hume in particular did much with the subject of habit and custom, but were never able to take them into full fellowship with substances, rights, etc.

Locke's use of toleration is one of the most satisfactory (from my standpoint) illustrations of the double use of a category. Toleration is an entity, so far as it works. It is God's eternal principle up to a certain point. Then it is not a principle at all when it has ceased to be utilitarian.

INTEREST

The best category of all is the one they all seek to eliminate. In order to get a typical case each seeks to eliminate interest. Hobbes even allies this interest with the personal Evil One. It must be cast out as from the Gaderine madman. Locke, too, would eliminate interest in the social situation in organizing government, and Hume must abstract sympathy from a situation from which interest has been eliminated. It would be fascinating to see how often and how industriously Mill does this work of elimination.

In this matter I wish to speak of two things: First, the associational psychology ever seeks to find how things would work under other conditions. The *laissez faire* economist does the same. In the first case the method is relatively harmless. In the second it has its social danger. The economic man with his unsocial characteristics is a social danger, because every assertion of his existence tends to make actual men approach his inhuman attitude toward life.

Second, the attitude of the sociologist of today requires him first to see the situation in its complexity. To him "interests" are everything as a starting-point.

THE SELF

It is needless to do more than point out that each philosopher has a different idea of the self, but that each conceives this self in some sort of hedonic terms. Each then tries to change this self into something else and each begs the question. I wish now to add to this statement three considerations:

First, each man saw some of the ways by which the self is developed and passed them by. Each man discussed group influence and each dropped it as not exactly part of his system.

Second, the statement of the social self in wholly hedonic terms is impossible. Much of the activity of man is never recorded in his own emotions. Further, happiness is not an end that men seek or can seek directly. It was at this point that Mill's confusion arose.

Third, this whole history from Hobbes to Mill shows in the study of the self a sort of homocentric movement. This feature keeps pace with the development of the hedonic aspect. Hobbes's man frankly egoistic, seeking the gratification of ends as coarse as his nature; Locke's man, seeking the adjustment of his pleasure to God's higher conception of pleasure; Hume's gentlemanly seeking for the development of delicacy of taste; and Mill's search for one who will become a martyr for his race—each of these is the result of the problem of his day as it appealed to each thinker. Hobbes is the medieval Tory, Locke the Puritan, Hume the pre-revolutionary French skeptic in many respects, and Mill the man who saw the dawning struggle of classes in modern times.

At the best, however, the self remains subjective and has now passed over into attitude, an objective category for which we are indebted to William Isaac Thomas.

Is it not clear that the categories are modified from author to author to accord with the general purpose of each thinker?

